



**JUDICIAL  
COLLEGE**

# Probation Officer Safety Training



August 2005

London, OH

THE SUPREME COURT OF OHIO JUDICIAL COLLEGE  
***Probation Officer Safety Training***  
August 2005— London, OH

**Day One**

- 8:55 Welcome** *J. Kristopher Steele*  
Program Manager  
The Supreme Court of Ohio,  
Judicial College
- 9:00 Introduction & Scope of the Problem** *Mr. Robert L. Thornton*, Director  
Community Corrections Institute, LLC  
  
*Mr. Ronald G. Schweer*  
Deputy Chief U.S. Probation Officer  
Eastern District of Missouri
- 9:50 Break**
- 10:00 Strategies for Survival &  
Use of Force Continuum**
- 10:50 Break**
- 11:00 Dealing with Aggressive Behavior &  
Safety Issues in Handling Emotionally  
Disturbed Offenders**
- 12:00 Lunch**
- 1:00 Office Safety & Field Safety**
- 1:50 Break**
- 2:00 Department Safety Issues &  
When Deadly Force is Used**
- 2:50 Break**
- 3:00 Training that Meets the Legal Challenge &  
Critical Incident Stress Debriefing**
- 4:00 Conclusion**

## **Day Two**

**9:00 Welcome Back**

- A. Program Overview**
- B. Safety Awareness Overview**
- C. Your Role in Simulation Training**
- D. Simulations**
- E. Large Group Debriefing**

**12:00 Lunch**

**1:00 Simulations**

- A. Simulations Continued**
- B. Large Group Debriefing**
- C. SST Training Skills**

**4:00 Adjourn**

### **\*\*Note\*\***

**Due to role play activities that will be occurring,  
there are no planned times for breaks. They will occur as needed.**

## FACULTY BIOGRAPHIES

**ROBERT L. THORNTON**, M.Ed., is Director of Community Corrections Institute, LLC, a company dedicated to providing training and consultation specifically designed for corrections and law enforcement agencies. Previously, he served as a Supervising U.S. Probation Officer for over 27 years, during which he served as a faculty member of the Federal Judicial Center and has developed, and continues to provide training in, enhanced supervision, officer safety skills, dealing with aggressive behavior, effective communication skills, and management skills. He also conducts training for the National Institute of Corrections (NIC) and the American Probation and Parole Association (APPA). He co-authored the 1993 National Institute of Corrections monograph, *New Approaches to Staff Safety*, and is the author of *New Approaches to Safe Safety-Second Edition*, released in March, 2003. He authors the “**Spotlight on Safety**” column for the APPA “*Perspectives*” magazine and has published numerous other articles on officer and staff safety. Bob also serves as a subject matter expert for the National Institute of Justice “Incident Commander” simulation training website, the APPA On-Line Safety Training Program, and the APPA Audio Broadcast Safety Training Program.

Bob also conducts agency audits for NIC and has testified as an expert witness on issues relating to officer and staff safety. He is a member of the Federal Law Enforcement Officers Association, the American Society of Law Enforcement Trainers, Federal Probation & Pretrial Officers Association (FPPOA) and the American Probation and Parole Association, and serves as Chair of the associations Health and Safety Committee. He was the 1990 recipient of the Line Officer of the Year Award for the Western Region of the United States and the 1998 recipient of the Doyle Award, presented by FPPOA in recognition of his contributions to effective offender supervision issues. He was also the 2002 recipient of the Sam Houston State University Award presented by APPA “...in recognition of his outstanding contributions to scholarship in Community Corrections.”

**RONALD G. SCHWEER** is the Deputy Chief U.S. Probation Officer for the Eastern District of Missouri - St. Louis. Prior to this promotion, Ron was a Supervising U.S. Probation Officer for the District of Kansas. He has served in a number of positions during his federal career, including administration of a field supervision unit, District Training Coordinator, Contract Specialist for drug aftercare and mental health services, Home Confinement Coordinator, and WITSEC (Witness Protection) Officer. Ron has an undergraduate degree in Criminal Justice and a graduate degree in Public Administration. He has also completed the Federal Judicial Center’s (FJC) Leadership Development and Foundations of Management Programs.

Ron has over 27 years of experience in criminal justice, corrections and law enforcement. He has served in the federal system since 1990 and previously held the position of Court Services Specialist in charge all juvenile and adult probation programs for the Kansas Supreme Court, Office of Judicial Administration. Ron was also a Chief Court Services Officer for the Seventh Judicial District in Kansas.

In 1993, Ron was selected as a Safety Trainer for the Federal Judicial Center and presented safety programs to numerous districts throughout the United States. He has also served as a Consultant to the FJC in the Applied Officer Safety Program since 1996. The National Institute of Corrections (NIC) has sponsored a Safety Academy (Train-the-Trainer) Program since 1997 and Ron currently serves as a NIC Consultant and Faculty Member in this program. As a result of this participation,

Ron has been involved in the training of safety trainers from virtually every state in the nation. He is also a safety consultant for the American Probation and Parole Association and has provided safety training through his affiliation with the Community Corrections Institute and Sam Houston State University Spotlight Program. Ron has also served as a firearms instructor, assistant firearms instructor, OC spray instructor, and chairman of the Safety Committee in the District of Kansas. Currently, Ron is a member of the Anti-Terrorism Advisory Council, Special Response Team, Search Unit, and Surveillance Unit in Eastern Missouri.

In 1998, Ron was the recipient of the Paul J. Weber Award presented by the Kansas Correctional Association for his contributions to the field of community corrections. He has also received recognition as an EXCEL Award recipient by the U.S. Courts and has held a position as an adjunct faculty member at a local community college.

# Day 1

# **PROBATION OFFICER SAFETY TRAINING**

**Presented by**

**COMMUNITY CORRECTIONS  
INSTITUTE**

**AND THE**

**SUPREME COURT OF OHIO  
JUDICIAL COLLEGE**

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# **PROGRAM AGENDA**

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## **1. INTRODUCTION**

- A. PURPOSE OF PROGRAM
- B. PROGRAM OVERVIEW
- C. LIABILITY ISSUES

## **2. SCOPE OF THE PROBLEM**

- A. DEFINE VICTIMIZATION
- B. REVIEW STATISTICS RE: WHERE, WHEN AND HOW OFTEN OFFICERS ARE VICTIMIZED
- C. PROFILE OF SPECIFIC CASES-PROBATION OFFICERS KILLED OR SERIOUSLY INJURED

## **3. STRATEGIES FOR SURVIVAL**

- A. DEFINE TRIAGE
- B. ELEMENTS OF MENTAL CONDITIONING
- C. ELEMENTS OF MENTAL AWARENESS
- D. PERSONAL COMMITMENT
- E. COLOR CODE OF AWARENESS
- F. CRISIS REHEARSAL (THE "WHAT IF'S")

## **4. USE OF FORCE CONTINUUM**

- A. DEFINITION
- B. REASONABLE CONTROL GUIDELINES AND ATTACK POTENTIAL
- C. EXAMPLES OF ACCEPTED USE OF FORCE CONTINUUMS

## **5. DEALING WITH AGGRESSIVE BEHAVIOR**

- A. IDENTIFYING YOUR THREAT *EARLY WARNING SYSTEM*
- B. IDENTIFY VERBAL AND NON-VERBAL BEHAVIORS ASSOCIATED W/ BLUFF BEHAVIOR
- C. APPLY *APPROPRIATE INTERVENTION* (BOTH VERBAL AND NON-VERBAL) FOR THE CORRESPONDING LEVEL OF BLUFF BEHAVIOR.
- D. RECOGNIZE DANGER BEHAVIOR AND YOUR OPTIONS FOR SAFE RESOLUTION
- E. HOW DRUGS AND ALCOHOL IMPACT BEHAVIOR

## **6. SAFETY ISSUES IN HANDLING EMOTIONALLY DISTURBED OFFENDERS**

- A. RED FLAGS-WHAT TO LOOK FOR
- B. PROFILES
- C. PHYSICAL SIGNS OF FAILURE TO TAKE MEDICATION
- D. MENTAL HEALTH DIAGNOSIS AND THE PROPENSITY OF VIOLENCE
- E. SEX OFFENDERS

**7. OFFICE SAFETY**

- A. PHYSICAL CONSIDERATIONS
- B. COVER AND CONCEALMENT
- C. ALARM SYSTEMS

**8. FIELD SAFETY-MORE OFFICERS KILLED AND INJURED**

- A. SAFETY PLANNING QUESTIONS
- B. APPROACHING A RESIDENCE
- C. FIELD CONTACT CHECKLIST
- D. CONTACT AND COVER
- E. CANINE CONSIDERATIONS
- F. EFFECTIVE EQUIPMENT SELECTION (CELL PHONES, RADIOS, BODY ARMOR, OC SPRAY, FIREARMS)
- G. CONTROL AND TRANSPORT OF PRISONERS
- H. VEHICLES

**9. DEPARTMENTAL SAFETY ISSUES**

- A. HEALTH AND SAFETY
- B. DEPARTMENTAL INVESTIGATIONS

**10. WHEN DEADLY FORCE IS USED**

- A. EFFECTIVE USE OF FIREARMS
- B. PRESERVING THE SCENE
- C. SURVIVING THE INVESTIGATION

**11. TRAINING THAT MEETS THE LEGAL CHALLENGE**

- A. SAFETY AWARENESS TRAINING
- B. FLOW OF TRAINING
- C. D.T. INSTRUCTION
- D. SIMULATION TRAINING

**12 . CRITICAL INCIDENT STRESS DEBRIEFING**

**CLOSING REMARKS.**

# Liability

# LIABILITY

OBJECTIVE: Create awareness of the legal issues surrounding officer safety training.

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## NEGLIGENT FAILURE TO TRAIN

- ▶ employee has not been instructed or trained by the supervisor or agency to a point where he possesses sufficient skills, knowledge or activities required of him in the job
- ▶ administrative agencies and supervisors have a duty to train employees and failure to do so subjects the supervisor and agency to liability

## SOURCES OF LAWSUITS

- ▶ a client whose rights have been violated by an officer who has not been properly trained
- ▶ a subordinate who suffers injury in the course of duty because he has not been properly trained

## NEGLIGENT HIRING

- ▶ hiring an employee who is unfit when there was knowledge that the person was unfit or the employer should have known he was unfit
- ▶ importance of a thorough background investigation

## NEGLIGENT ASSIGNMENT

- ▶ assigning an employee to a position without ascertaining whether or not he is adequately prepared for it
- ▶ keeping an employee in a position after he is known to be unfit

## NEGLIGENT FAILURE TO SUPERVISE

- ▶ failure to oversee employee activity properly
- ▶ tolerating a pattern of improper behavior ( deliberate indifference)

## NEGLIGENT FAILURE TO DIRECT

- ▶ failure to properly inform an employee of the specific requirements and proper limits of the job to be performed
- ▶ importance of a clearly written manual of policies and procedures for departmental operations

### **NEGLIGENT ENTRUSTMENT**

- ▶ failure of a supervisor to supervise or control properly an employee's custody, use or supervision of equipment or facilities entrusted to him on the job

### **NEGLIGENT RETENTION**

- ▶ failure to take action against an employee in the form of suspension, transfer or termination when the employee has demonstrated unsuitability for the job to a dangerous degree
- ▶ was the employee unfit to be retained and did the supervisor know or should he have known the unfitness

### **DIRECT VS. VICARIOUS LIABILITY**

- ▶ DIRECT - action taken against the immediate supervisor
- ▶ VICARIOUS - action taking against a higher supervisor if the negligence can be traced beyond the immediate supervisor

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### **LIABILITIES FOR INADEQUATE TRAINING**

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#### ***Popow v. Margate, 476 F Supp. 1237, 1246 (1979)***

The court found “a complete failure to train” because (among other things) the accused agency did not provide instruction on shooting at moving targets...night shooting...shooting in residential areas...or any experience films or simulations designed to teach the practical application of deadly force decision making.

#### ***City of Canton v. Harris, 109 S. Ct. 1197 (1989)***

The court ruled that inadequate training in the use of deadly force serves to establish an official policy of indifference, exposing the employer to sever liability risks.

#### ***Zuchel v. City and County of Denver, Colorado, 997 F. 2d 730 (1993)***

Following Harris, the court found that the situation (a use of deadly force) the officer encountered was a usual and recurring situation with which...officers were required to deal. The city’s training program...was inadequate, so the city could be held liable.

Litigation against government entities now accounts for 26% of all federal civil cases.

***Davis v. Mason County, 927 F.2d 1473 (1991)***

Training of officers on use of force was practice that fell within sheriff's policymaking authority. While most of the deputies involved had some type of training, even if it was minimal at best, the issue was the adequacy of training. While they may have had some training in the use of force, they received no training in the constitutional limits of the use of force.

# Scope of the Problem

# SCOPE OF THE PROBLEM

OBJECTIVE: Create awareness to potentialities and the range of possible dangers that an officer may face.

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## ► VICTIMIZATION

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*VICTIMIZATION* is defined as:

"... ANY VIOLENCE, THREAT OF VIOLENCE, INTIMIDATION, EXTORTION, THEFT OF PROPERTY, DAMAGE TO ONE'S REPUTATION OR ANY OTHER ACT WHICH INFLECTS DAMAGE, INSTILLS FEAR, OR THREATENS ONE'S SENSIBILITIES."<sup>1</sup>

- William Parsonage

When examining the subject of victimization, it is critical to understand that victimization is self-perceived; not other perceived. If someone feels that they have been victimized; they have been. How the event is interpreted by the victimized officer is what is important. Another person's interpretation of the act is not consequential.

Until the research of William H. Parsonage, a professor at Pennsylvania State University, probation workers have not been thought of as a *victim*. Many have proffered that probation and parole workers knew what they were getting into or, because in the conduct of their jobs they are expected to deal with potentially dangerous people and situations. By virtue of the aforementioned definition of victimization, and in spite of the nature of the job, they are as much a victim as anyone.

The ensuing victimization data illustrates the degree, assailant, location and context of victimization of probation and parole workers.


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<sup>1</sup> Parsonage, William H. and W. Conway Bushey, "The Victimization of Pennsylvania Probation and Parole Workers in the Line of Duty," A Survey, The Pennsylvania State University, 1988.



## CAREER VICTIMIZATION RATES

National Snapshot: Career Victimization Rates




National Snapshot: Percent of Officers Victimized in Their Career (1989)<sup>2</sup>

State	Number
Texas Board of Pardons and Parole	41%
Virginia Division of Probation and Parole	39%
New York State Probation	55%
Pennsylvania Statewide Survey	38%

<sup>2</sup> Parsonage, William H., *Worker Safety in Probation and Parole*, U.S. Department of Justice, National Institute of Corrections, 1990.

Middle Atlantic States Correctional Association (1990)




**Table Percent of Officers Victimized in Their Career:  
Middle Atlantic States Correctional Association (1990)<sup>3</sup>**

Incidents	CT	DE	MD	NJ	NY	PA	VT
Career Victim Rates	71%	59%	65%	56%	65%	62%	84%
Assault	30%	15%	15%	12%	14%	26%	33%
Intimidation	70%	57%	64%	55%	64%	61%	84%

<sup>3</sup> Parsonage, William H. And Joseph A. Miller, *A Study of Probation and Parole Worker Safety in the Middle Atlantic Region*, Middle Atlantic States Correctional Association (MASCA), 1990.

# MASCA Study of Locations




## Middle Atlantic States Correctional Association Study of Locations (1990)<sup>4</sup>

Location	CT	DE	MD	NJ	NY	PA	VT
Phone	16%	9%	24%	20%	17%	8%	15%
Letter or Mail	1%	0%	3%	6%	3%	1%	7%
Message by Other	14%	9%	9%	9%	11%	3%	18%
Office	53%	27%	55%	43%	50%	19%	41%
Client's Home	24%	32%	14%	15%	21%	26%	18%
Another's Home	4%	9%	2%	6%	4%	4%	15%
Prison or Jail	10%	4%	7%	12%	11%	10%	22%
Police Station	4%	4%	0%	4%	2%	0%	30%
Service Agency	6%	0%	7%	3%	6%	2%	7%
Courtroom	12%	4%	17%	8%	6%	9%	11%
In Vehicle	12%	0%	4%	9%	5%	2%	7%
Client's Work Site	4%	9%	1%	3%	2%	1%	0%
Public Facility	8%	9%	4%	2%	4%	3%	4%
On the Street	8%	14%	11%	20%	13%	8%	18%
Hallway/Elevator	12%	0%	2%	10%	0%	1%	7%
Other Location	8%	4%	8%	9%	0%	2%	11%

## CONTEXT

### MASCA Study of Context



Middle Atlantic States Correctional Association Study on the Context for Most Serious Victimization (1990)<sup>5</sup>

Context	CT	DE	MD	NJ	NY	PA	VT
Announced Visits	32%	32%	50%	35%	41%	20%	33%
Surprise Visits	37%	45%	25%	37%	30%	15%	30%
Offender Arrest	24%	41%	4%	11%	14%	18%	22%
Other Arrest	0%	9%	4%	3%	2%	7%	4%
Offender Call for Help	9%	4%	13%	11%	11%	6%	11%
Family Call for Help	12%	9%	10%	8%	9%	2%	18%
Domestic Dispute	16%	4%	3%	8%	10%	2%	7%
Offender Transport	14%	9%	6%	7%	5%	9%	7%
Other Context	30%	24%	32%	37%	38%	22%	50%

# FEDERAL PROBATION OFFICERS ASSOCIATION STUDY

## Assaults Against Officers Nationwide 1980 - 1992 (48% of Jurisdictions Responding)

Murders . . . . .	14
Rapes . . . . .	2
Other Sexual Assault . . . . .	99
Shot and Wounded . . . . .	8
Use of Blunt Instrument or Projectile . . .	46
Slashed or Stabbed . . . . .	14
Car Used as Weapon . . . . .	4
Punched, Kicked or Choked . . . . .	691

TABLE 2

Attempted Assaults Against Officers  
Nationwide By Category  
(1980 - 1992)

Att. Murders .....	2
Att. Rapes .....	5
Att. Other Sexual Assault .....	1
Shot At (and missed) .....	24
Att. Use of Blunt Instrument or Projectile .....	14
Att. Slashing or Stabbing .....	14
Att. Use of Car as Weapon .....	8
Att. Punching, Kicking, Choking or other use of body	705
Att. Use of Caustic Substance .....	2
Att. Unspecified Assault .....	<u>17</u>
Total	792

# U.S. Probation & Pretrial Services

## Hazard Duty Incidents - 1984 to 1999

<u>Type of Incident</u>	<u>1984</u>	<u>1985</u>	<u>1986</u>	<u>1987</u>	<u>1988</u>	<u>1989</u>	<u>1990</u>	<u>1991</u>	<u>1992</u>	<u>1993</u>	<u>1994</u>	<u>1995</u>	<u>1996</u>	<u>1997</u>	<u>1998</u>	<u>1999</u>
Animal Attacks	6	5	7	12(c)	9	4	8	9	16	14*	19**	34***	11*	17	26	31
Armed Invasion-Bldg.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-
Assaults & Attempts	5	1	-	2	5	4	2	5	-	12	5	10	5*	2(f)	2	-
Auto. Accidents	-	-	-	-	6	4	-	-	-	1	6	9	8	6(g)	6	16
Auto. Assaults	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Auto. Burglaries	-	-	1	-	3	1	-	1	1	-	-	-	4	1	-	-
Auto./Personal Acc.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	4	-	-	-	-	-	-	13
Auto. Situations (e)	-	-	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Auto. Vandalism	-	-	1	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	3	-
Bomb	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-
Bomb Threats	-	-	-	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	4	1	2	1	2
Chemical Exposure	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	1	-	-
Contag. Disease Exp.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	7	1	8	9	9
Dangerous Situations	-	4	1	-	-	-	11	26	52	17	22	26	18	13	29	12
Explosive Device	-	-	-	1	1	1	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-
Gunshots at Office	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Happening Upon	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Violent Crime	-	-	-	1(d)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Haz. Chem. (Office)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-
Hostage Situation	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-
Hotel Burglary	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-
Individual/Crowd	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Intimidation	-	-	10	7	17	5	-	9	27	26	21	30	14	14	17	16
Intervention In	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Altercation	-	-	-	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Miscellaneous (b)	-	-	-	-	16	33	21	11	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-

<u>Type of Incident</u>	<u>1984</u>	<u>1985</u>	<u>1986</u>	<u>1987</u>	<u>1988</u>	<u>1989</u>	<u>1990</u>	<u>1991</u>	<u>1992</u>	<u>1993</u>	<u>1994</u>	<u>1995</u>	<u>1996</u>	<u>1997</u>	<u>1998</u>	<u>1999</u>
Murder of Officer	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Occupied Veh. Hit	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
By Gun Fire	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-
Offender Physically	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Restrained	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-
Office Security Vio.	-	-	-	-	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-
Office Vandalism	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-
Personal Injuries	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	3	3	-	4	-
Phone/Letter/	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Indirect Threats	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	18	40	-	37	48	30
Phone/Letter/Verbal	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Indirect Threats	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	27	-	-	-
Purse Snatching	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Range Injuries	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	1	1	-	2	3
Robbery	-	1	-	3	1	1	-	-	-	-	-	1	1	-	-	-
Robbery/Assaults	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	3	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Situations w/Firearms	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
or Edged Weapons	4	-	9	9	12	7	10	9	9	14	21	9	14	8	15	18(h)
Threats	33	27	25	16	42	35	21	34	44	40	-	-	-	-	-	-
Unintentional Firearm	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Discharge	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-
Verbal Threats	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	20	18	-	16	8	22
Other	5	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	4	1	8	16
<b>TOTALS</b>	<b>53</b>	<b>40</b>	<b>57</b>	<b>57</b>	<b>115</b>	<b>95</b>	<b>73</b>	<b>105</b>	<b>156</b>	<b>127</b>	<b>144</b>	<b>194</b>	<b>114</b>	<b>126</b>	<b>179</b>	<b>188</b>

(a)

\* - Cap-Stun used once.

\*\* - Cap-Stun used twice.

\*\*\* - Cap-Stun used three times in 4<sup>th</sup> quarter.



- (a) - Some incidents were reported more than 30 days after the end of the quarter, the 1994 total is more than the sum of the totals published for each of the four quarters.
- (b) - Examples: Dangerous home visits, solicitation by drug dealers, attempted bribery, confiscation of drugs, police raid while on home visit, officer inadvertently sprayed with mace, encounter with offender experiencing serious mental health problem, implied threats, automobile accidents, punctured tire, venomous snake bite, hostage release negotiation, encounter with armed person in field, accidentally falling down stairs, destruction of government property by unknown party, and incidents that could not be tied to an officer's official duty.
- (c) - Of these attacks, 5 resulted in bites on the officer.
- (d) - Officer happened upon the scene of a violent crime (triple murder).
- (e) - Automobile situations involving an unstable driver and car following officer.
- (f) - Armed Assault = 1, Unarmed Assault = 1.
- (g) - Includes one (1) accident with injury to an officer.
- (h) - Firearms = 14, Edged Weapons = 4.

NOTE: There were 41 incidents reported in 1983, 33 in 1982, and 40 in 1981. The 1983 incidents consisted primarily of 21 threats against officers, 2 physical attacks upon officers, and 4 assaults (near physical contact). The specific nature of the 1982 and 1981 incidents is not available.

#### CLARIFICATIONS:

1. Situations w/Firearms or Edged Weapons in 1984 was actually referenced as Guns (pointed, confiscated, or present).
2. Dangerous Situations in 1985 was actually referenced as Fugitive Apprehension or Drug/Weapon Confiscations.
3. The Dangerous Situation in 1986 was listed as Rock Throwing.
4. Situations w/Firearms or Edged Weapons in 1987 was actually referenced as Weapons (in possession, but not used - 5 knives, 4 guns); 1988 was Weapons (11 guns, 1 knife); and 1989 was Weapons (7 guns).
5. The type of Threats listed in 1986 were 15 verbal, 6 telephone, and 4 written; 1987 included 10 verbal, 5 telephone, and 1 written; 1988 included 22 verbal, 11 written, and 9 telephone; and the specific threats for 1989 were [24] verbal, 9 telephone, and 2 written.
6. The annual total reported in the News and Views for 1998 was 178, however, the correct sum is 179.

### HAZARDOUS INCIDENT LOCATIONS

<u>Location</u>	<u>1984</u>	<u>1985</u>	<u>1986</u>	<u>1987</u>	<u>1988</u>	<u>1989</u>	<u>1990</u>	<u>1991</u>	<u>1992</u>	<u>1993</u>	<u>1994</u>	<u>1995</u>	<u>1996</u>	<u>1997</u>	<u>1998</u>	<u>1999</u>
Office/Court	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	24	38	29	-	-	-	-	-
Field	-	-	8	13	-	-	-	-	36	73	72	62	45	43	98	94
Home of Def./Off.	15	17	23	15	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Court	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	14	6	4	13	12
Office	14	11	7	18	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	44	28	36	49	48
Courthouse/Jail	9	2	5	8	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Other	15	10	14	3	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	18	8	22	16	34
<b>TOTALS*</b>	<b>53</b>	<b>40</b>	<b>57</b>	<b>57</b>	<b>-</b>	<b>-</b>	<b>-</b>	<b>-</b>	<b>60</b>	<b>111</b>	<b>101</b>	<b>138</b>	<b>87</b>	<b>105</b>	<b>176</b>	<b>188</b>

\* - Incidents involving persons/animals.

(a) - 3<sup>rd</sup> & 4<sup>th</sup> quarter figures only (1<sup>st</sup> & 2<sup>nd</sup> quarters not available).

### HAZARDOUS INCIDENT PERPETRATORS

<u>Perpetrator</u>	<u>1984</u>	<u>1985</u>	<u>1986</u>	<u>1987</u>	<u>1988</u>	<u>1989</u>	<u>1990</u>	<u>1991</u>	<u>1992</u>	<u>1993</u>	<u>1994</u>	<u>1995</u>	<u>1996</u>	<u>1997</u>	<u>1998</u>	<u>1999</u>
Offender/Defendant	30	21	27	25	-	-	-	-	38	63	55	78	46	45	77	74
Other	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	22	48	40	33	18	28	59	56
Unknown	18	14	11	18	-	-	-	-	-	-	6	-	-	-	-	-
Anonymous	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	21	17	18	23	35
Family Member	5	3	6	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	6	6	14	10	14
Dog	-	-	7	12	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Inmate/Former Client	-	-	6	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
<b>TOTALS*</b>	<b>53</b>	<b>38</b>	<b>57</b>	<b>57</b>	<b>-</b>	<b>-</b>	<b>-</b>	<b>-</b>	<b>60</b>	<b>111</b>	<b>101</b>	<b>138</b>	<b>87</b>	<b>105</b>	<b>169</b>	<b>179</b>

\* Incidents involving persons/animals.

(a) - 3<sup>rd</sup> & 4<sup>th</sup> quarter figures only (1<sup>st</sup> & 2<sup>nd</sup> quarters not available).

**FOOTNOTE:** Location and perpetrator information was not available from the resource cited for the years 1988 to 1991.

**RESOURCE:** News and Views. Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts. Issues 3/25/85 to 1999.

**PREPARED BY:** Ronald G. Schweer, Deputy Chief U.S. Probation Officer, Eastern District of Missouri, St. Louis.

**Characteristics Of Perpetrator In Most Serious Past-Year Incident (percentages)**

	99 Field Officers
Perpetrator's status	
Offender (probationer, parolee)	81.6
Offender's family member	6.1
Offender's friend or acquaintance	9.2
Bystander	0.0
Animal	0.0
Other	3.1
Age	
Under 15 years	0.0
15-17 years	0.0
18-21 years	7.1
22-29 years	49.0
30-39 years	30.6
40-49 years	10.2
50+ years	3.1
Gender	
Male	88.8
Female	10.2
Unknown	1.0
Race/Ethnicity	
Caucasian	62.9
African American	29.9
Hispanic	5.2
Native American	1.0
Asian American/Pacific Islander	1.0
Employment Status	
Employed full time	11.2
Employed part time	7.1
Unemployed	73.5
Unknown	7.1
Dispositional Status	
Community custody	20.4
Pre-sentence case	2.0
Post-release supervision	13.3
Community supervision	43.9
Monetary	1.0
Probation	4.1
Parole	4.1
Unknown	3.1
Other	8.2
Sentencing Status	
Misdemeanor	3.1
Class C felony	15.5
Class B felony	43.3
Class A felony	27.8

**Weapons Possessed/Used By Perpetrator In Most Serious Past-Year Incident (percentages)**

	<b>99 Field Officers</b>
Firearm (handgun, rifle, shotgun)	
Used or threatened to use	27.8
Possessed but didn't use/threaten to use	12.4
Did not possess	59.8
Knife or other sharp-edged instrument	
Used or threatened to use	11.3
Possessed but didn't use/threaten to use	18.6
Did not possess	70.1
Impact instrument	
Used or threatened to use	6.2
Possessed but didn't use/threaten to use	14.4
Did not possess	79.4
Vehicle	
Used or threatened to use	1.0
Possessed but didn't use/threaten to use	14.4
Did not possess	84.5
Animal	
Used or threatened to use	4.1
Possessed but didn't use/threaten to use	10.3
Did not possess	85.6
Other	
Used or threatened to use	18.6
Possessed but didn't use/threaten to use	10.3
Did not possess	71.1

**Psychological Impacts Of Most Serious Past-Year Event (percentages)**

	<b>99 Field Officers</b>
Fear on the job	36.1
Reduced self confidence	13.3
Reduced sense of trust in clients	40.8
Reduced sensitivity to clients	19.4
Increased use of medications	4.1
Increased use of alcohol	2.0
Disruption in personal life	23.5
Disruption of family live	20.4
Enhanced sense of self confidence	11.3

**Job Performance Consequences Of Most Serious Past-Year Event (percentages)**

	<b>99 Field Officers</b>
Less open with co-workers	18.4
Less open with clients	23.5
Thought about quitting the job	23.5
Applied for a transfer	10.2
Avoided contact with co-workers	6.1
Avoided contact with threatening clients	22.4
Other	8.1

# Strategies for Survival

## LEARNING OBJECTIVES

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# STRATEGIES FOR SURVIVAL

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By the end of this session, you will be able to:

- define *triage*
- describe the three concepts of *mental conditioning*
- list the five levels of *mental awareness*
- explain the concept of *crisis rehearsal*



# SURVIVAL SENSITIVITY

OBJECTIVE: Increase officers' survival sensitive.

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► STREET FACTS <sup>6</sup>

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- Nothing is *routine*.
- No two *situations* are ever exactly alike.
- *Behavior* is not predictable.
- The only predictable is *the unpredictable*.
- Each step of the way you must consider *opportunities* the a subject might have to injure you.
- Whenever possible you want to cultivate *tactics* for the unexpected.
- Whether attacks and assaults are elaborately or hastily planned, or are the result of an *impulsive* act, it can be carried out without difficulty, or time consuming and complex preparation.
- No special *skills* are required.
- The *means* and *opportunity* to carry out an attack and assault against you generally are readily at hand.
- There are no predictable recurring patterns of physical behavior or physical circumstances that can be *identified* and *isolated* as *reliable indications* of an assailant personality or provocation for an attack.
- Almost anyone, male or female, young or old, intelligent or stupid, can *successfully* attack and assault you.

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<sup>6</sup> "Ambush Attacks," Police Weapons Center, LEAA, U.S. Department of Justice, Research Division of the International Chiefs of Police, 1974.

- Most attacks are conceived and executed by subjects who are generally acting *alone* and without ties to criminal or deviant groups.
- An assailant can decide when, where and whom to attack, on grounds that are purely selfish or totally *irrational* and discriminate.
- In most instances, a subject may do so out of panic, desperation, confusion, anger, fear, derangement, exasperation, revenge, intoxication, hallucination, political zeal, suicidal yearning, or . . . .
- Times, places, configurations and methods of attacks and assaults do not frequently evidence any readily suggested common *denominators*.
- Attacks and assaults can be carried out by *straight forward visible approach* or by a *hidden* and *inconspicuous ambush*.
- The method of the assault can be by *corporal* strike or by a *dangerous or deadly weapon*.
- Weapons can be easily *hidden* on or about the person.
- *Suitable weapons* can be procured from anything.

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► TRIAGE

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*TRIAGE* is a french word meaning: *PICKING, SORTING, CHOOSING*.

Triage is designed to affect the way you  
*prepare, plan and react*  
to keep you alive in real situations.

They fall into two categories:<sup>7</sup>

- Those that will help you *prevent* risky situations from *escalating* into life threatening encounters; and,
- Those that can help you *survive*, if despite your best efforts, violence does erupt.

Most triage techniques:

- Are simple and based upon *common sense*; however, they require *extensive use and application* to be successful.
- They must become *honed in, natural and reflexive*, for under stress, in a crisis, you will instinctively revert to the way you have been trained.

With a triage orientation, you keep firmly planted in your mind  
that you are always approaching a situation  
*anticipating* a dangerous situation.<sup>8</sup>

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<sup>7</sup> Adams, McTernan and Remsberg, op. cit.

<sup>8</sup> Ibid.

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► **SURVIVAL STATE OF MIND<sup>9</sup>**

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- First step in surviving on the job is to adjust *mental attitudes*.
- You must remind yourself repeatedly that probation is a *hazardous* occupation, demanding your constant vigilance.
- A subject's background, attitudes, motivation, willingness to reason and inclination for *aggressive and violent behavior* may be quite different from yours.
- There are legal, moral and psychological implications that must be *anticipated* and *personally resolved*.
- You must operate at a heightened *sensory and intuitive level*.

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► **TACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS**

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- There are no *absolutes* in tactics.
- *Action* is always quicker than *reaction*.
- No set of procedures are *always* effective.
- When you least expect it, *expect* it.
- Always let the *circumstances* dictate tactics, not *vice versa*.

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<sup>9</sup> Adams, McTernan and Remsberg, op. cit.

**OBJECTIVE:** Assess and determine officers' attitudes and "survival state of mind."


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► **ROLE CONFLICT CONTINUUM**

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**COURT**

**CLIENT**



**COMMUNITY**

Police Officer

Social Worker

**Where would you place yourself?**



---

► **WHY OFFICERS UNDER-REACT<sup>10</sup>**

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- Failure to understand the *dynamics* of confrontations.
- Failure to *be mentally prepared*.
- Failure to *receive* training.
- Failure to *believe* in training.
- Failure to believe in their *ability*.
- *Mythical Thinking*.
- *Inhibition*.
- *Moral Repulsion*.

---

► **FATAL TENDENCIES<sup>11</sup>**

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- Act without *waiting for backup*.
- Rely heavily on *reading* people.
- Drop guard when *good* is perceived.
- *Unbalanced* Public Relations/Service orientation.
- *Shortcut* rules and procedures.
- Use *less* force than peers.
- Use force *later* than peers.

---

<sup>10</sup> Adams, Ronald J., Thomas M. McTernan and Charles Remsberg. *Street Survival: Tactics for Armed Encounters*. Calibre Press, Inc.: Northbrook, Illinois (1986 ed.), 1980.

<sup>11</sup> Remsberg, Charles. *The Tactical Edge: Surviving High Risk Patrol*. Calibre Press, Inc.: Northbrook, Illinois (1993 ed.), 1986.

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► **STREET SURVIVAL<sup>12</sup>**

---

*STREET SURVIVAL* is the:

Realistic anticipation of threats that may arise;  
and, developing options for preventing or resolving those threats safely.

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► **PROPER ACTION REQUIREMENTS<sup>13</sup>**

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- Remaining *alert*;
- Being *decisive*; and,
- Having a planned and *practiced response* in mind.

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► **AWARENESS CODE SYSTEM<sup>14</sup>**

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- Condition WHITE
- Condition YELLOW
- Condition ORANGE
- Condition RED
- Condition BLACK.


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<sup>12</sup> Adams, McTernan and Remsberg, op. cit.

<sup>13</sup> Ibid.

<sup>14</sup> Cooper, Jeff, *Principles of Personal Defense*, Paladin Press: Boulder, Colorado, 1972.

## MENTAL AWARENESS:



*Mental Awareness* refers to how conscious or alert we are to our environment. Often our duties are strictly routine and require only a minimal amount of preparedness, awareness, and energy to accomplish. Prolonged and routine cooperation and compliance by our clients can cause us to adopt an expectation of non-resistance that leave us completely unprepared for dangerous situations or violent assault.

As a probation or parole worker, you must remind yourself repeatedly that this is a hazardous occupation, demanding your constant vigilance. A client's background, attitudes, motivation, willingness to reason, and inclination for aggressive and violent behavior may be quite different from yours. In dealing with our clients, there are legal, moral and psychological implications that must be anticipated and personally resolved. You must operate at a heightened sensual and intuitive level. The means and opportunity to carry out an attack and assault against you generally are readily at hand.

Street survival is the realistic anticipation of threats that may arise and developing options for preventing or resolving those threats safely. The following Color Code of Awareness was developed by Jeff Cooper. It provides a visual mind set designed to heighten officer awareness.

- ☛ **White:** *Totally relaxed* state of mind. Unarmed and in familiar surroundings. No person present is a conceivable threat.
- ☛ **Yellow:** *Relaxed awareness.* The people within arms reach are not always friendly.
- ☛ **Orange:** *State of alarm.* You have a tactical situation in mind and have considered provocation that may arise which will substantiate use of force. You are approximately three seconds from a confrontation.
- ☛ **Red:** *State of combat.* You are the physical target. A confrontation is imminent.
- ☛ **Black:** *Blind panic.* The threat overwhelms you and you fail to control your adversary.




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► **DEFENSIVE REACTION CYCLE<sup>15</sup>**

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- *Perception*
- *Evaluation*
- *Reaction*



*Action is always  
quicker than reaction.*

---

► **ADRENALINE DUMP REACTION<sup>16</sup>**

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- New or dangerous situations trigger the "fight or flight" response.
- Whether you face real or imaginary fear, physical danger, or emotional stress, the reaction is the same.
- Stressful reactions will cause adrenaline dump, thus speeding up the cardiovascular system.
- Adrenaline dump becomes energy.
- Your pulse quickens.
- Your muscles tense.
- The resulting rush of adrenaline equips you for any extra effort you might need.

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<sup>15</sup> Desmedt, John, Police S.A.F.E.T.Y. Systems, Inc., 1989, as instructed by R. Scott Schlechter, Master Instructor, Protective (Police) S.A.F.E.T.Y. Systems.

<sup>16</sup> Ibid.

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► **AWARENESS MODEL<sup>17</sup>**

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- **P** repare
- **O** bserve
- **L** imitations
- **I** solate
- **C** ontrol
- **E** vacuate

The difference between  
paranoia and awareness  
is  
**CONTROL.**

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<sup>17</sup> Desmedt, John and James Marsh, *Speedcuffing, A Tactical Handcuffing System*, The Police S.A.F.E.T.Y. System: Grand Falls, Virginia, 1983.

## CRISIS REHEARSAL:



*Crisis Rehearsal* is the use of mental images (internal movies) to develop appropriate reactions to confrontations. By repeatedly imagining yourself in a crisis where you successfully defeat a threat, you "pre-set" yourself to respond with the same proficiency in a real encounter. Your visualization of practicing proper tactics, physical, and equipment skills, "programs" your nerves and muscles to respond automatically and lessens your susceptibility to stress interference.

Most techniques for dealing with potentially dangerous situations are simple and based upon common sense. However, they require extensive use and application to be successful. They must become natural and reflexive, for under stress, in a crisis, you will instinctively revert to the way you have been trained.

The most effective means of practicing *crisis rehearsal* is to continually review or discuss with a partner "what if..." scenarios, e.g. what if the offender is intoxicated, in the middle of a drug deal, fighting with a spouse, etc. These are basic examples of crisis rehearsal.

# Use of Force

## LEARNING OBJECTIVES

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# THE USE OF FORCE

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By the end of the section, you will be able to:

- define *use of force*
- identify six *use of force considerations*
- define what is meant by the *Use of Force Continuum*
- describe how the Use of Force Continuum can be applied in a *confrontation situation*

# FORCE

OBJECTIVE: Examine the Use of Force.

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► **FORCE DEFINITION**

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*FORCE* is the means by which you get people to:

stop doing what they want to do  
but you don't want them to do ...  
and start doing what you want them to do  
but they may not want to.

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► **PURPOSE OF FORCE**

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The *PURPOSE* of any level of force is:

***CONTROL***  
and  
Maintaining  
a Position of  
Advantage

---

► **USE OF FORCE TEST<sup>18</sup>**

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What force would a  
*reasonable officer at the scene*  
have used under the circumstances?

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► **USE OF FORCE CONSIDERATIONS<sup>19</sup>**

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- Your need for split-second decision-making.
- Severity of the crime involved.
- Subject's immediate threat to safety.
- Subject's active resistance or attempt to escape.
- Adapting readiness of position in correlation to subject's resistance level.
- If a technique is not working and you can't control the subject, you can always escalate or disengage.

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<sup>18</sup> Graham v. Connor, 109 S. Ct. 1865 (1989).

<sup>19</sup> Adams, McTernan and Remsberg, op. cit.

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► **S.A.F.E.T.Y. MODEL**<sup>20</sup>

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*TACTICS* should be:


- **S**imple            Easy to learn and apply.
- **A**cceptable        To the officer, administration and general public.
- **F**ast                The longer a physical confrontation lasts, the less chance the officer has in prevailing without resorting to extreme measures.
- **E**ffective           It can work for all officers.
- **T**rainable           For officers at all skill levels.
- **Y**ielding            The officer may increase or decrease the amount of control. The system will work even if the officer makes mistakes.

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
<sup>20</sup> Desmedt, op. cit.




## USE OF FORCE MODEL<sup>21</sup>



<sup>21</sup> Desmedt, John, *The Use of Force Paradigm for Enforcement and Corrections*, The Police S.A.F.E.T.Y. System, 1982, 1990.




Continuum of Force Model developed by the Federal Judicial Center.



### **PRESENCE:**

Your mere presence conveys a degree of authority and control. Your authority is inherent in your position regardless of the message you choose to convey. The degree of authority conveyed by your presence can be reduced or increased through facial expression and body language.


- **Open stance:** No current threat perceived. Your posture conveys a personal greeting; you may be sitting or standing, hands are at side or palms are outward.
- **Interview stance:** This should be used when talking to an offender. Stand about 3 feet away, facing at a 45 degree angle. Hands should be held chest high.
- **Defensive stance:** Exaggerated interview stance. Threat has been perceived and you are prepared for action.



### VERBAL:


Our verbal tactics are the safety tool we most often use and can provide our best defense.

- **Questioning & Assessment:** Questions designed to gain a sense of the situation. e.g. diffusion steps.
- **Persuasion:** Discussion of what is expected and why compliance is in the client's best interest.
- **Light Control (Advise):** Clearly directing what is expected.
- **Crisis Diffusion:** Diffuse aggressive behavior with verbal skills and good judgment, allowing an opportunity to escape and continue discussion on "safer" ground.
- **Heavy Control (Warning):** Clearly articulating consequence for noncompliance.




**CAP-STUN:**

Cap-Stun is a Oleoresin Capsicum product (a pepper derivative). Cap-Stun is a brand name and a registered trade mark. The use of a chemical agent precedes physical force because there is less chance for either party to suffer serious injury. The Committee on Criminal Law approves Cap-Stun II for officer use, with the Court's permission. It is effective on animals, intoxicated individuals, persons under drug influence and the psychotic.



#### EMPTY HAND CONTROL:

Encompasses various defensive tactics; an unarmed physical reaction to an attack. There are some basic but effective blocking, restraint, and control holds and techniques that can be learned, however, they must be practiced regularly to be effective. Defensive tactics training should be regular and ongoing.



**LETHAL FORCE:**

The level of last resort is lethal force. If the officer faces the realistic threat of death or serious bodily injury without the possibility of safe retreat, then the officer is legally and administratively permitted to use deadly force. It may mean the use of any "weapon" to which the officer has access. Note: Firearms are lethal force, but not all lethal force involves firearms.

### *SHIELDING*

- Shielding (also known as cover) is something that will absorb the power of attack.
- Shielding will deflect or slow down an attacker, bullets or other types of weapons or projectiles. It is meant to protect you from bodily injury.
- Shielding awareness applies whether you are in your car or on foot, approaching a location or subject, or eating your lunch.

### *DISTANCE*

- Close to a situation as tactical is a tactical myth.
- Stay at least two (2) arm lengths away; this removes you from striking distance.
- If you are less than two arm lengths from the subject, you can not count on stepping to evade. You will not be able to step out of the way of a sudden attack, even if you are paying strict attention to the subject. To do so, is beyond the limitations of your nervous system.

### *MOVEMENT*

- The effect of an assault is harmless outside of the power envelope; that is close to defend from a strike before it develops power or moving out of the power envelope.
- If you are the proper distance from a subject, you have a good ability to evade an assault by stepping out of the power envelope.
- It is harder to assault a moving target.

### *PROPER COUNTERMEASURES*

- Proper Countermeasures means being equipped with a planned response and use of force options available

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<sup>22</sup>

Desmedt, op. cit.



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## ▶ REASONABLE CONTROL GUIDELINES


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- Match your force to their resistance.
- Correctly apply techniques and equipment appropriate to that force level.
- Apply alternative options if your tactics fail to establish control.

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## ▶ RELATIVE POSITIONING<sup>23</sup>

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### *INSIDE*

- In front of the subject or between his arms is the most vulnerable position for you to assume.
- This is the most dangerous place because the human body is made to perform in a forward motion.
- This position is compounded if you are not in the proper position (within two arms length) since you are in striking distance of a subject's hands, elbows, knees and feet.

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<sup>23</sup> Desmedt, op. cit.

**OUTSIDE** (Anywhere that is not inside, is an outside position)

- *Position 1:* Forty-five (45°) degree to the front (inside) of the subject. Better relative position than the inside; decreased vulnerability. Feet shoulder width; body bladed to subject; weak side front.
- *Position 2:* Facing the subject at the side of his or her body (90°). You can assume control in this position. You are facing (fight forward) the subject but he/she is not facing you.
- *Position 2½:* On a line 45° to the rear of the subject. This is the weakest position for the subject's arms or legs to reach. Best position; least vulnerable. ESCORT POSITION.
- *Position 3:* Facing the rear of the subject body. The optimum position from which to assume control since the subject is facing in the opposite direction.

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► **POSITIONING FOR CONTROL**<sup>24</sup>

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- Always try to be in and control from an outside position.
- Try to get to the highest position you can in order to establish control.
- Try to stay one height level above subject; have the subject seated.
- Keep centered, balanced.
- Keep both of your feet on the ground.

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<sup>24</sup>

Desmedt, op. cit.

***TOOLS WITHOUT TACTICS = LAWSUITS***

***TOOLS MUST BE AUTHORIZED BY THE AGENCY***

***TACTICS ARE THE APPLICATION OF THE TOOLS***

**TIMING-IT'S NOT HOW, BUT WHEN. THE  
BIGGEST ISSUE IN TRAINING IS NOT HOW TO  
USE THE TOOL-BUT WHEN.**

# Dealing with Aggressive Behavior

## LEARNING OBJECTIVES

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# DEALING WITH AGGRESSIVE BEHAVIOR

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By the end of this section, you will be able to:

- explain the role *angering behavior* plays in the communication process
- identify your *early warning system* that alerts you to potential threat
- identify the *verbal and non-verbal behaviors* associated with bluff behavior
- apply the *appropriate intervention* for the corresponding level of bluff behavior
- clearly recognize *danger behavior* and your options for safe resolution
- identify how use of *drugs* can impact behavior
- incorporate guidelines for *dealing effectively* with emotionally disturbed persons

## *DEALING WITH AGGRESSIVE BEHAVIOR*



### *SELF AWARENESS*

The first step in dealing effectively with other people is to deal effectively with yourself. We cannot control the behavior of others, but we can influence their choices by practicing self awareness and control. Take a few moments and answer the following questions.

- ☐ What happens to your body when you feel anxious or threatened?
- ☐ What do you tell yourself when you begin to feel threatened?
- ☐ What do you do when you begin to feel threatened?
- ☐ What are some of the things other people do that irritate you or make you feel uncomfortable?
- ☐ Are there certain people or groups of people that make you feel uncomfortable?
- ☐ What information or skills do you need to learn to be safe and effective in dealing with angry, aggressive, or combative people?

## **THE FIGHT OR FLIGHT SYNDROME**

To deal effectively with angering behavior, we need to have some idea of what is happening physiologically, since recognizing and dealing with this part of the behavior system is vital to effective resolution.

We must first understand that as a “*control system*” the primary purpose of our behavior is need-satisfaction/system survival. Whenever we perceive something to be potentially need-threatening, we begin to use whatever behaviors are necessary to survive the threat. The behaviors we use basically come from “two brains,” each with very separate and sometimes conflicting responsibilities. We will talk more about the brain and aggression later, but for now, it is important to understand that the “*old brain*” (or mid-brain area) deals with physical survival; the “*new brain*” (cerebral area) deals with our psychological needs and interactions with the “real” world. In dealing with aggressive situations, the physiological part of our behavior system has commonly been described as the *Fight or Flight Response*.


Basically, this involves the following process:

***Perceived threat → sympathetic nervous arousal system (involuntary nervous system) → pituitary and hypothalamus activated → neurotransmitters → adrenal glands → adrenaline and cortisone → energy.***

### **Instantaneous Physiological Changes**

- \*Dilation of pupils***
- \*Decrease in salivation.***
- \*Increase in rate, strength and regularity of heart.***
- \*Increase in blood pressure.***
- \*Redirection of blood to “gross motor” muscles.***
- \*Partial blood clotting.***
- \*Bowel/bladder control loosens.***
- \*Senses sharpen/focus.***

While we will always experience a physiological component when threatened, the extent to which we experience these symptoms depends upon how threatening we perceive the situation to be. To illustrate this, let's take a look at the following:



Here we find Fred (our primitive man - controlled largely by his "old brain") faced with a sabre-toothed cat. Fred's choices are fairly clear - as is the perceived threat: if he can win, he'll probably "fight"; if he doesn't think he can win, he'll probably "flight."

As our world has gotten more complicated, and our perceptions of "threat" less clear, so have our choices. Let's age Fred by several thousand years. His "new brain" is now more developed, so he perceives more things and choices, yet his "old brain" is still saying "*Fight or Flight*." Neither of those two choices may now be appropriate. In fact, it is the conflict between our "two brains" - one saying "go for it!" and the other saying "wait a minute, maybe. . ." - that creates what are often referred to as "stress-related illnesses/disorders," e.g., hypertension, high blood pressure, heart disease, etc., since these two brains have to work in harmony for us to be "healthy." Consider again poor Mr. Fred's situation. Neither the *perceived threats* nor the options are as clear as they used to be.



# FIGHT OR FLIGHT




What this means to us in dealing with angering people is that we often don't know what is being perceived as threatening to them. Regardless, their "*old brain*" is producing whatever energy is necessary to survive. Yet the "*new brain*" is still selecting and evaluating possible choices. Herein lies the conflict . . . *as energy is created, it needs to be released*; yet our socialization process has taught us to "qualify" the way we release our energy (anger). Consider the example of the teapot on the hot stove. As the energy (heat) increases, it seeks release; yet as long as the lid remains (similar to the "regulating" functions of the "new brain"), the pressure can only build until explosion (danger) is imminent.

## TOTALITY OF CIRCUMSTANCE

We can all handle some degree of change in our lives. There comes a point, however, when we are having too many things change all at once - or one change is so difficult (e.g., divorce, etc.) that we can't take anymore without getting angry and feeling threatened or overwhelmed. We call this *Totality of Circumstance*.

**Recognition:** *The point at which our 'status quo' behaviors are interrupted so severely that we respond inappropriately.*



When are you least able to effectively deal with anger and aggression? (Describe a situation where you experienced "Totality of Circumstance").

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
## PROBABILITY

Let's talk about how people act. Have you ever noticed that you tend to do the same things over and over, e.g., go to work, eat lunch with the same people, go home, watch certain television programs, go to bed at set times, etc.? The way we live our lives tends to follow *patterns*.

Behaviorists have traditionally explained this type of behavior as a result of stimulus response conditioning, i.e., behavior is a function of its consequence. The problems with this type of thinking are:

1. There is a strong implication that control of our behavior is external to us and that we can control (or be controlled by) other people.
2. Since we aren't in control of ourselves, we can't be held responsible for what we do.

This kind of thinking is typical with angering behavior. Consider all that is involved in the often-heard statement, "She made me mad!" The perception/belief becomes, "I'm not in control of me and you are responsible for what I do." Let's take a look at the following diagram; it should help explain what is happening.




What this diagram shows, is that while we are in control of the choices we make, we tend to repeat those sets of behaviors we are comfortable with and which we think may be effective at getting us what we want. We seek consistency in our choices of behavior and the farther we progress using a chosen set of behaviors, the greater the probability we will complete the pattern.

This is particularly true with angering behavior. Consider your relationships as an example. Have you noticed that the issues you argue about are usually the same ones over and over (typically, in-laws and money!)? Think about when you begin the fighting behaviors you use. You'll find it is almost like each of you is reading from a script . . . s/he says something, then you respond, and so on. Each of you know what you are "supposed" to do and how you are "supposed" to act. The longer this goes on, the harder it becomes to stop.

This process describes what typically happens with people who use angering frequently. They tend to progress toward greater and greater degrees of being “angry.” The trick is:

1. For you to *recognize the behaviors that constitute the pattern*, and then . . .
2. Try to *intervene as early as possible*. The reason for this is simple: the earlier you attempt to break a patterned behavior, the easier it is to stop the behavior.



## **BLUFF BEHAVIORS**

*Bluff behaviors are those behaviors used to communicate, deter, or frighten through intimidation.*

## DEFUSION QUESTIONS

The following questions are designed to provoke thought in a potential aggressor. Remember...one of your goals is to try to keep the person in the thinking area of the brain. Asking questions helps you accomplish this.

☛ Ask: ***"What do you want?"***

- Try to clarify their issue.
- Listen and reflect.



☛ Ask: ***"What are you doing?"***

- If they don't answer, describe what they are doing, e.g. yelling, cursing, etc.

☛ Ask: ***"Is this helping?"***

- Get them to evaluate their effectiveness in using the behavior they have chosen.




☛ Offer a non-violent option.

- Provide them other options to get what they want.

## ***BLUFF BEHAVIORS***

Bluff behaviors are those behaviors used to communicate, deter, or attempt to frighten through intimidation.



## ***ANXIETY BEHAVIOR***


**Definition:** Seemingly purposeless behaviors signaling low-level fear and/or confusion.

**Recognition:** Excessive movement or talking, catastrophic expectations, furtive eye movement.

- pacing
- twitching
- tapping fingers
- shaking

**Response:** Remain calm, reassure, ask questions, provide information.


- listen
- acknowledge feelings
- be non-judgmental
- be positive and reassuring



## DEFENSIVE BEHAVIOR

- Definition:** Purposeful behaviors designed to protect against mid-level perception of threat.
- Recognition:** System shut-down or focusing, including auditory, visual and cognitive functions. The focus is on the immediate source of the perceived threat or conflict.
- Response:** Ask questions, provide choices, clearly define limits and consequences, increase personal distance (6-8 feet).
- Use the *Rule of Five*: communicate with sentences of no more than five words and words of no more than five letters.






## AGGRESSIVE BEHAVIOR

- Definition:** Active intimidation perceived for high-level fight/flight situation.
- Recognition:** Incessant questioning, verbal and non-verbal refusal to cooperate, verbal explosion/abuse
- Response:** Prior to the verbal explosion, provide limits and choices; after the verbal explosion, wait for the system to *relax*.
- ask questions
  - provide choices
  - increase personal distance

## *DANGER BEHAVIOR*



**Definition:** Instinctive fight/flight action designed to ensure system survival

**Recognition:** Verbal and non-verbal focusing; quiet yet deliberate preparation for violence/action.

- quiescent period
- feet spaced and shoulders in line with hips
- elbows bent and on vertical plane
- leg, neck and hip muscles contracted
- mouth slightly open, nostrils flared
- eyes set, focused
- face flushes to diminishing color
- fists clenched
- persistent theme evident

**Response:** Ask questions, clarify potential consequences of aggression, identify and use escape routes.

# Mental Health Issues

# MENTAL HEALTH ISSUES

**OBJECTIVE:** Create awareness of the mental health issues surrounding officer safety training

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## **KNOW THE OFFENDER AND THEIR MENTAL HEALTH ISSUES**

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- Review information from treatment clinicians.
- Understand diagnostic impressions-axis 1 & 2.
- Know the effects of medications and their withdrawal symptoms.
- Look for any “Red Flags” in file-history of assault, drug abuse, failure to take medication.
- Be alert to signs of inappropriate affect.
- Study the symptoms of common mental health disorders.
- Be aware of “situational triggers.”
- Be alert to delusional thinking patterns.
- Acquaint yourself with treatment programs available and their approaches.
- Be alert to-
  - Signs of increase paranoia
  - Unkept appearance
  - Drastic change in clothing and overall appearance



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## **EXPERIENCE INCREASES OUR AWARENESS**

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- Obtain as much background information as possible from collateral sources.
- When dealing with mental health offenders be aware of your nonverbal communication.
- Mood swings of the offender can be a “red flag” indication that the offender has quit taking their medication or that their condition is worsening.
- Pay attention to what may seem to be casual comments-they can give insight to their thinking behavior.


- Be aware of inconsistent behaviors.
- Pay attention to your “gut feelings”-if it seems wrong it probably is!
- Listen to what the mental health offender describes as their “physical symptoms,” they can be indicators of their state of mental health.
- Talk with other PO’s that have worked with the offender and get their impressions and experiences.
- Seek “off the record” information by treatment staff and others that have contact with the offender, especially treatment support staff.
- Realize that you will probably need to spend more time with the mental health offender, both in direct contact and with collateral sources, to get a true picture of the mental state of the offender.
- Ask open-ended questions and use simple words and terms.

---

### **INCREASE YOUR MENTAL AWARENESS**

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- Consider scheduling the initial contact in the office, treatment facility, or other safe location, not the offender’s home.
- Never let an offender know your address or details about your family or personal life
- Plan your interviews to:
  - Determine the risk of the offender to themselves and others.
  - Demonstrate caring in your conversations.
  - Be open in your communications.
  - Plan your conversations to gather relevant information from the offender and others.
- Monitor the offender’s access to weapons.
- Ask for help from clinicians, other PO’s, and law enforcement when warning signs occur.
- Ride in pairs-but be sure to educate your partner regarding the special issues of mental health offenders.
- Advise law enforcement of locations of times of contacts-be proactive!



- Use family, neighbors, coworkers, etc. to provide current information on the offenders activities and mental health condition.
- Plan method and location of contacts, i.e., announced or unannounced, office or residence, number of officers.
- Showing respect tends to establish positive bonds. Many mental health offenders are commonly dismissed and want someone to listen to them.
- Pay special attention to their, and your, space. Remember your “reactionary gap.”
- Keep escape routes open.
- Don’t escalate a situation by your behavior.
- As always, expect the unexpected .

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### **IMPORTANT & MISUNDERSTOOD TERMS**

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The following are commonly used terms in dealing with mental health offenders. Make sure you know the definitions if you use the terms, and when others use them, it may be beneficial to question them as to the specific behaviors they attribute to these definitions.

- Delusions
- Hallucination
- Disordered thinking
- Panic attack
- Phobia
- PTSD
- Paraphilia

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### **THE ANSWER-CREATIVE SUPERVISION**

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- Maintain intimate knowledge of the case.
- Maintain open lines of communication with the offender and others associated with the case.

- Utilize technology, i.e., GPS, electronic monitoring, drug and alcohol monitoring, etc.
- Conduct both scheduled and unscheduled contacts based on the needs of the case.
- Recognize the symptoms of the offenders disorder and the effects of prescribed medication.

The more time you spend with the case will help you keep abreast of any changes and can reduce the risk to you and others.

Maintain a good working relationship with others involved in the case; they can supply current information and alert you to signs of deterioration of the case

- Ask the right questions.
- Watch for changes in the offender's behavior.
- Utilize mentors and paraprofessional when available to help closely monitor the case.
- Avoid confrontation, especially on the offenders "turf."
- Offer support both verbally and nonverbally.
- Quickly respond to signs of medication abuse or medication withdrawal.
- Keep weapons concealed.
- Use calming techniques.
- Don't show shock or get disturbed.
- Show respect.
- Show concern after a crisis.
- Establish your professional role as officer.
- If you are present during a psychotic episode or assault, leave.
- Be persistent in your requirements regarding treatment and supervision requirements without being demanding.
- Take a vital role in the treatment plan by maintaining contact with treatment providers and the offender.
- Be proactive.

# Office Safety



# OFFICE SAFETY

**GOAL:** Determine security equipment and procedures to reinforce office safety.

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## ► LAYOUT

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- Use a solid door and wall (shielding) to separate the office proper from a waiting area.
- Waiting area should be accessible for observation.
- Position equipment to avoid blind spots or traffic flow.
- Use a sterile interview room or position desk and chairs so a subject is not between you and an exit.
- Position desks and chairs so that an offender is not between you and an exit.

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## ► CONSIDERATIONS

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- All visitors, subjects and guests, must be escorted and under supervision at all times.
- Visitor identification badges are cheap to implement and validates presence.
- Be cognizant of items around that can be used as a weapons.
- Establish a code system for encrypted communication.

## **Video Discussion Guide**

### **Scenario 1**

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1. Critique the receptionist's handling of the situation.
  - What did she do well?
  - What, if anything, could she have done differently?
2. Critique the office and reception area.
  - What safety measures were built into the reception area?
  - What safety measures could be added to the reception area?
  - What safety measures were built into the office area?
  - What safety measures could be added to the office area?
3. Before being confronted by the offender, what, if any, precautions could (or should) the officer have taken?
4. Once the officer was confronted by the armed offender, what were the options available to the officer?
5. Discuss other areas of concern.

The following information is taken from the U.S. Courts design guide which lists considerations and specifications for the design of Probation offices.

It also addresses considerations for agencies located in high crime areas.

### **U.S. Probation Office (USDC)**

The following functional areas are unique to the office:

- Reception counter with counter-to-ceiling break-resistant glazing.
- Urinalysis (UA) toilet.
- UA supplies storage.
- UA testing (EMIT) laboratory and secure sample storage.
- Electronic monitoring office.
- Electronic monitoring equipment storage/repair room.
- Gunlock (for those locations where officers are authorized to carry weapons).
- Secure computer terminal/printer room.

The following functional areas are not required: Library.

### **Pre-Trial Services Office (USDC)**

The following functional areas unique to the office:

- Reception counter with counter-to-ceiling break-resistant glazing.
- UA toilet.
- UA supplies storage.
- UA testing (EMIT) laboratory and secure sample storage.
- Electronic monitoring office.
- Electronic monitoring equipment storage/repair room.
- Gunlock (for those locations where officers are authorized to carry weapons).
- Secure computer terminal/printer room.

The following functional areas are not required: Library.

## Design Requirements

The personal office space of the circuit executive, distric executive, senior staff attorney, chief probation officer, chief pre-trial services officer, and Federal public defender should be provided with finishes listed below or equivalent. These finishes represent a quality standard or benchmark and are not intended to dictate specific design solutions or treatments.

### Base

- Four-inch (100 mm) high coved vinyl base, typical throughout (unless dictated by design conditions).

### Floor

- Thirty-eight ounce (1.07 kg) face weight synthetic (nylon or equal), commercial grade carpet (direct glue-down method) or thirty-eight ounce (1.07 kg) face weight carpet tiles (18-inch or 450 mm by 18-inch or 450 mm).

### Ceiling

- Suspended acoustical tile and/or gypsum wall board finishes, as dictated by the design or existing building decor conditions. Other ceiling elements, such as soffits, perimeter coves, recesses, and reveals shall be provided as required to integrate HVAC and lighting into a harmonious design.

### Walls

- Gypsum wallboard on metal stud construction, finished with Type II vinyl wall covering.

### **Doors and Frames**

- AWI, custom grade hardwood veneer solid core doors. Door frames to be either solid hardwood jambs, door stops and casings or hollow metal, as dictated by the design or existing building decor condition.

General office areas and other assigned spaces are to be finished according to the requirements contained in PBS-PQ100.1.

### **Toilet (U.S. probation and pre-trial services offices)**

A toilet is required in each office for UA sample collection.

These toilet rooms should be used only for the collection of urine samples and should not be used for any other purpose. Each room must accommodate both the person providing the sample and a probation or pre-trial services officer.

The officer must be able to visually monitor the sample collection process continuously; use of a mirror is acceptable.

Barrier-free access for handicapped persons must be provided.

The door to the toilet room should be locked at all times except when the room is being used. Any means of access through the ceiling plenum, pipe chase, and other similar spaces must be eliminated.

The public reception/waiting area should be adjacent, for the convenience of persons reporting for UA only.

### **UA Supplies Storage (U.S. Probation and Pre-Trial Services Offices)**

A securable closet equipped with shelving on 2-3 walls should be provided. Any means of access through the ceiling plenum and similar spaces must be eliminated.

The UA toilet room(s) and the UA testing lab should be adjacent to UA supplies storage. The storage area should be accessible through restricted circulation only.

**Urinalysis Testing (EMIT) Lab and Sample Storage (U.S. Probation and Pre-Trial Services Offices)**

The door to this room should be locked at all times except when the room is being used. Any means of access through the ceiling plenum, pipe chase, and other similar spaces must be eliminated.

The room must accommodate the following items:

- Two counter-top EMIT machines, each requiring a footprint area of at least 30 inches (775 mm) deep by 60 inches (1525 mm) wide, 110-V “clean” power, and additional adjacent counter space with a height at 44 inches (1125 mm) above finish floor level.
- Two operator stools.
- A double sink with disposer, set in a cabinet at least 8 feet (2425 mm) long with a counter height at 44 inches (1125 mm) above finish floor level, with adjacent 110-V convenience outlets and storage above and below.
- Two full-sized refrigerators with freezers, one for samples awaiting testing and the other for chain-of-custody storage of samples with positive test results.
- Provision for trash disposal.

Countertops should have chemical-resistant laboratory-type finishes.

This room should be accessible only from restricted circulation; it should be located adjacent to both the UA toilet room(s) and the UA supplies storage closet.

**Electronic Monitoring Office (U.S. Probation and Pre-Trial Services Offices)**

This office is shared by two officers when monitoring fewer than 25 clients. If more than 25 clients are to be served, more than one such office is required.

Each officer requires a desk, a return, a credenza or other secondary worksurface, a swivel armchair on a five-caster base, and a five-drawer vertical file cabinet.

The office also contains the following:

- A visitor chair.
- Two storage cabinets.
- Two work tables.
- A fax machine, which can be shared with other office units.

The door to this office should have a key lock. The office should be accessed only from a restricted circulation path; it should be adjacent to the electronic monitoring equipment storage/repair room.

**Electronic Monitoring Equipment Storage/Repair Room (U.S. Probation and Pre-Trial Services Offices)**

The equipment to service one client can be stored in a box approximately 3 feet (925 mm) long by 1 foot (300 mm) wide by 1 foot (300 mm) deep; these boxes may be stored on steel shelving. If more than 25 clients are to be served, the size of the room should be increased.

The room also contains a work table, with adjacent 110-V convenience outlets, used in repair of the equipment.

The door to the room should have a key lock.

The room should be accessed only from a restricted circulation path; it should be adjacent to the electronic monitoring office.

**Secure Computer Terminal/Printer Room (U.S. Probation and Pre-Trial Services Offices)**

The door to this room should be lockable and secure a cipher lock, card reader, or keypad to limit entrance to authorized personnel. Any means of access through the ceiling plenum, pipe chase, and other similar spaces must be eliminated.



The room should be accessed only from a restricted circulation path; it may be somewhat remote from the remainder of the office (e.g., in a basement) under the control of the agency.

## **Security**

The security and alarm systems for the various Judiciary-related offices should function as an integral part of the security and alarm systems for the total facility. Doors to executive offices, senior staff offices and enclosed storage rooms should have key locks, except as otherwise noted. Secure storage spaces should be provided with heat sensors. Single fixture toilets should have privacy locks. Doors from public reception/waiting areas to restricted access areas should have electric strike locks. Reception/public counter workstations should be equipped with silent duress alarms connected to the USMS control/communications room. In addition, duress alarms should be located in supervisors' offices and general office areas accessible to all probation officers. The public counter in the U.S. Probation Office and Pre-Trial Services Office must be break-resistant and equipped with a counter-to-ceiling break-resistant glass screen, with windows at counter workstations. Refer to document PBS-PQ100.1: Chapter 8. Security Design for additional security criteria.

### **Location of Security and Alarm Systems**

Place security alarms in the Office of the Circuit Executive (USCA): near the receptionist at the main entrance door, and selected inner area.

The Office of the Staff Attorney (USCA) requires these systems near receptionist at the main entrance door, in selected inner areas and for secure storage.

**Office of the District Executive (USDC).**

- Receptionist at the main entrance door.
- Selected inner area.
- U.S. Probation Office (USDC):
- Reception/public counter.
- Supervisor's office.
- Selected inner area.
- Secure storage.

**Pre-Trial Services Office (USDC).**

- Reception/public counter.
- Supervisor's office.
- Selected inner area.
- Secure storage.

**Federal Public Defender.**

- Reception/public counter.
- Supervisor's office.
- Selected inner area.
- Secure storage.

## **CHAPTER 14: SPECIAL SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS**

In the planning stage of any new construction, the U.S. Marshals Service (USMS), in conjunction with the General Services Administration (GSA), assesses the security needs of the building. When that assessment dictates security measures beyond the standard level outlined elsewhere in this document, the design team is advised.

### **Court Security in High Crime Areas**

Courthouses in high crime areas require special security consideration during design. Persons working in or visiting such buildings are often subject to harassment or attacks by criminals who frequent the area. The following are some of the security measures that can be appropriate to such locations:

- Fully enclosed parking. Although secure parking should always be provided for judges and USMS prisoner vehicles, fully enclosed parking is especially critical for buildings located in high crime areas. Lack of a fully enclosed parking area can necessitate a security post in the parking area staffed full-time to prevent damage to vehicles or attacks on the Judiciary.
- Special consideration to ensure the safety of court employees as they enter and leave the court facility. Protected parking for employees, in addition to that for judges, might well be warranted.

- Secure parking for jurors.
- Closed circuit television (CCTV) systems installed to enable the U.S. Marshals Service (USMS) personnel view of judges, jurors, and court employees in the parking area. Such cameras usually are monitored by the court security officers (CSOs) at the entry screening post.
- Perimeter intrusion systems. Installation is critical in the design of a building in a high crime area. Ground floor windows should be protected with glass break detectors or other types of sensor technology. Such systems should be monitored on a 24-hour basis by GSA or by CSOs on-site or off-site.
- Break-resistant plastic film on windows to deter break-ins.
- Bullet-resistant counters and windows at the public counters for the Clerk's Office, Pre-Trial Services Office, U.S. Probation Office, and USMS Office where access to these areas does not require that visitors pass a weapons screening point.
- No direct public access to a court library.
- A separate stairwell system for both the judicial egress routes and the prisoner egress routes from upper floor areas. The objective of egress route design is to maintain the separation of the circulation systems.

#### **Security for Leased Facilities in High Crime Areas**

The following can be appropriate to leased facilities:

- Bullet-resistant counters and windows at the public counters for any Pre-Trial Services Office and U.S. Probation Office located outside the courthouse where access to these areas does not require that visitors pass a weapons screening point.
- Leased parking lots that are enclosed and monitored by a parking attendant for any Judiciary-related offices located outside the courthouse. (The distance of such parking lots from the courthouse makes surveillance by the USMS impracticable.)
- Duress alarm systems connected to the alarm panel in the USMS Office in the court building so officers can respond quickly to a security problem.

### **Court Security for High-Threat Trials**

Certain courthouses, due to their size or location, are more likely than others to be the site for high-threat trials for crimes such as terrorism, drug dealing and other forms of organized criminal activity. Although a high-threat trial can occur anywhere, some courthouses are the location of frequent and repeated high-risk trials. The following are some of the security measures that can be appropriate to such locations:

- A comprehensive perimeter intrusion system monitored by an on-site, 24-hour security force.
- CCTV coverage of the exterior of the building monitored by CSOs at the entry screening post or the USMS communications center. Special spot lighting can be required to improve CCTV coverage of vulnerable areas.
- Vehicle barriers, both fixed and movable, to prevent explosives-laden vehicles from getting next to or under the courthouse.
- Break-resistant plastic film on windows to deter break-ins and minimize damage in a bombing.
- Card reader systems. Due to the tighter level of security control required in such courthouses, it can be necessary to install card reader systems to improve control and accountability at the employee entrance, access points to restricted and secure corridors, and restricted and secure elevators.
- A specially designed courtroom incorporating additional security measures for a multi-defendant trial or a trial with a single highly visible defendant. Security measures for such a courtroom can include some or all of the following: walk-through metal detectors at the public entrances to the courtroom, door contacts connected to the USMS communications office, a bullet-resistant shield between the public area and the well, video cameras tied to the duress alarm system to provide immediate visual assessment of a courtroom problem, and security key-locking systems on courtroom doors.

# Field Safety

## LEARNING OBJECTIVES

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# FIELD SAFETY

---

By the end of this section, you will be able to...

- identify issues and concerns involved in making a *field contact*
- describe the roles of *contact and cover* during field contacts
- describe various techniques for *approaching a residence*
- identify safety issues in dealing with *canines*
- describe issues in the effective *selection of safety equipment*
- list issues in the safety operation of *vehicles*

# CONTACT QUESTIONS

OBJECTIVE:      What if ?

---

---

▶ **WHO IS THE SUBJECT ?**

---

- Assess subject's *actual* and *potential* profile.
- Assess *signs* of deteriorating behavior.
- Assess subject's *stress* factors.

---

▶ **WHAT IS THE PURPOSE OF THE CONTACT ?**

---

- Necessity of contact.
- Scheduled, surprise or surveillance.
- Locating an absconder.
- Making an arrest.
- Responding to a perceived or actual crisis.

The purpose of your contact  
will always  
dictate your approach and tactics.



---

► **SCHEDULED CONTACT ?**

---

- Scheduled contacts allow subjects to prepare and conceive an image, personality or environment.

---

► **SURPRISE CONTACT ?**

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- Surprise contacts causes the subject to be at greater risk with a higher propensity to be caught in compromising situations.
- Surprise contacts usually provide more information about the subject.

Contacts with a  
predisposition for problems  
must be approached  
with tactics in mind.

---

► **TACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS**

---

- Postpone the contact if in doubt.
- Get backup.
- a response to anyone's request for help, requires a *minimum* of 2 officers.

---

► **REDUCING THE ODDS OF ASSAULT<sup>33</sup>**

---

*You reduce the odds  
of being attacked by:*

- 70% with 1 other officer present.
- 90% with 2 or more officers present.

---

► **WHERE IS THE CONTACT TAKING PLACE ?**

---

*Office Contact*

- Advantage for the officer.
- Availability and quicker response to problems.
- Control people or animals.
- Observation of behavior before initiating contact.
- Screening for weapons or other contraband.

*Subject's Residence*

- Although it provides more information about the subject; advantage for the client.
- Little control of people or animals present.
- Unfamiliarity of the environment; hiding areas and entrance/escape routes.

*Public Place*

- Depending on location!
- Either an advantage or disadvantage.
- Neutral environment; parity in control and risk.



---

▶ **WHEN IS THE CONTACT TAKING PLACE ?**

---

- Time of day.
- Weather conditions.
- Lighting conditions.

**Time of day, weather conditions  
or lighting conditions  
can be a limitation  
for you or the subject.**

# LIGHT CONDITIONS

**OBJECTIVE:** Adjust to varied lighting conditions and environments.

---

---

## ► LIGHT CONTROL

---

- Your risk goes up at night or in dim light environments.
- There may be too little illumination for you to quickly perceive images that warn of danger.
- You need to be constantly aware of sources of light; direct and reflective.
- Be aware of how you can manipulate light and darkness to your advantage and the subject's disadvantage.

---

## ► PHYSIOLOGY OF VISION <sup>34</sup>

---

- Your eyes need light to record images.
- Rapid changes can cause temporary blindness.
- Pupils need about 20 seconds to adjust to changing states of light.

---

## ► PHYSIOLOGY OF NIGHT VISION <sup>35</sup>

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- It usually takes about 30 minutes for night vision to develop.
- Colds, headaches, fatigue, smoking, drugs and alcohol significantly reduce night vision.

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
<sup>34</sup> Anthony, Catherine Parker. *Textbook of Anatomy and Physiology*. The C.V. Mosby Company: St. Louis, Missouri, 1967.

<sup>35</sup> Ibid.

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## ▶ ANATOMY OF AN EYE <sup>36</sup>

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## ▶ IN DIM OR DARK LIGHT <sup>37</sup>

---

- Don't focus directly at an object.
- Utilize off-center vision.
- Look slightly to the side, above or below the object 6° to 10°.
- Scanning strengthens off-center vision.
- Use flashlights.

---

<sup>36</sup> Anthony, Catherine Parker, op. cit. Rods are highly light sensitive. Cones are less sensitive to light. The fovea which is used in direct vision, contains the greatest concentration of cones and is, therefore, the point of most clear vision in good light. In dim light or darkness, we can see an object better by focusing the image nearer the periphery of the retina where rods are more plentiful.

<sup>37</sup> Ibid. In a darkened area, try to utilize off-center vision. Don't focus directly on an object. Direct vision requires the use of eye cells; cones, that are least sensitive to light. When you look slightly to the side, above or below the object (6° to 10°), the image is formed on the area of the eye with cells; rods, most sensitive in darkness. Scanning strengthens off-center vision. If you try to hold an image in the corner of your eye longer than 4 to 10 seconds, it gradually *bleaches* out.

---

► **GOING FROM BRIGHT TO DIM LIGHT** <sup>38</sup>

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
- Use sunglasses in bright light conditions.
- Close one eye, after entering dim/dark lighting, open that eye.

---

► **FLASHLIGHTS**

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- An important and versatile tool.
- Can be used as an individual protection device.
- Extend the flashlight away from your body.
- Stay behind the beam of light.



# APPROACH TACTICS

**OBJECTIVE:** To safely approach locations and determine limitations.

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## ▶ GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS

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- Anticipate the address your looking for as you approach the area.
- Drive-by the location to appraise the environment.
- Visually scan for limitations and problems.
- Be aware that people may be watching you although you may not see them.
- Stay conscious of your surroundings; be alert to possible hiding places, including rooftops and nearby vehicles.
- Utilize all your senses to collect data.
- Be aware of potential booby traps.
- Utilize all your senses to collect data.

---

## ▶ VEHICLE PARKING

---

- Do not park directly in front of the building; you could be observed and set up.
- Park your vehicle 3 or 4 doors away from the building, on the same side of the street.





---

► **AUDITORY SCANNING**

---

*Listen and identify conversation and noise.*

- Number of voices?
- Context?
- Tone/demeanor?
- Animal sounds?
- Music?

---

► **OLFACTORY SCANNING**

---

*Differentiate odors.*

- Cooking aroma or marijuana?
- Medical/Cleaning scents or drugs/cutting agents?
- Alcohol?
- Incense?

---

► **PHYSIOLOGY OF SMELLING** <sup>39</sup>

---

- Olfactory receptors are extremely sensitive; they are stimulated by even very slight odors, but .....
- They are easily *fatigued*.

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
<sup>39</sup> Anthony, Catherine Parker, op. cit.

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
## ► BUILDING APPROACH

---

Avoid a *direct* advance.



Use a *triangular* approach.



---

## ► VISUAL SCANNING

---

*Quick-peek through doors and windows.*


- What are the lighting conditions?
- Can you see weapons, drugs or other contraband in plain view?
- Does the environment look the same or different?
- Are there people and animals present?
- How many?
- Where are they?
- What are they doing?

---

► **DOOR POSITIONING**

---

- Use door jams as shielding.
- Doors and windows provide concealment but usually fail to provide shielding.
- Don't be visible as the door opens.
- Position yourself behind the non-hinged door jam for doors opening inward.
- Position yourself behind the hinged door jam for doors opening outward.



---

► **DOOR APPROACH**

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- Develop a mental picture of what is happening inside.
- Knock or ring the bell in a normal fashion.

*If the a subject refuses to answer, despite the fact that you know someone is inside:*

- Call from a phone.
- Return later.
- Don't force a confrontation.

*If a subject responds:*

- Maintain shielding.
- Never enter unless the door is opened for you.
- As the door opens, immediately scan the subject and the environment.

---

► **ENTRY**

---

- Don't be too quick to enter.
- Establish the number and identity of people and animals present, resides or frequents the location.
- Give instructions for animals to be removed from your immediate area.
- Assess the environment, demeanor of those present and your limitations to safety.
- Assess subjects' and your escape routes.
- Look for areas where subjects can hide or effectuate an ambush.

### *CONTACT OFFICER*

- Conducts all communication with subject; issues commands when required.
- Performs searches of subjects and environments.
- Handcuffs all arrestees.
- Recovers evidence and contraband.

### *POSITIONING OF COVER OFFICER*

- Personal *shielding*.
- *Unobstructed* view of contact officer and subject(s).
- Safe background (isolation) for *shooting*.
- *Peripheral* view of surrounding area.
- Control of likeliest *escape* route(s).

### *COVER OFFICER*

- Devotes full attention to the subject(s) through a position of surveillance and control.
- Discourages hostile acts by the subject(s).
- Alerts contact officer to any weapons, or attempts to hide, discard or destroy evidence and contraband.
- Intervenes with force if necessary to protect contact officer.
- Resists distraction.
- Constitutes an unspoken force presence.

---

<sup>40</sup> Albrecht, Steven and John Morrision, *Contact & Cover , Two Officer Suspect Control*, Springfield, Ill.: Charles C. Thomas, 1992.

# INTERVIEWING ENVIRONMENT

**GOAL:** Identify limitations and potential danger signs.

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## ► GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS

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- Ask that masking noises (i.e., radio) be terminated.
- Get a tour of the location.
- Unless required, isolate a subject from others.
- Have subjects sit in a chair.
- Limit yourself to sitting on hardwood furniture.
- Problems With upholstered furniture.

---

## ► MAJOR RULES

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- When in doubt, stay out.
- Subjects must always be in view while on their turf.
- Never let subjects leave your presence; always escort them to whatever location they must go.
- Never let subjects go into closets, draws or areas capable of hiding weapons.
- Never let subjects situate themselves between you and an escape route.

# CANINES

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Safety Hints: There are several "safety hints" that would prove valuable to probation and parole officers in dealing with canines while conducting business.

- ☛ *Remember - any dog is a potential "biter"*
- ☛ *Always observe for signs of a dog's presence*
- ☛ *Don't surprise a dog, call out, whistle, etc.*
- ☛ *Assume that the entire area is the dog's territory*
  - Take off sunglasses
  - Stand still; don't approach a strange animal
  - Stand sideways
  - Speak softly
  - Don't stare
  - Give the dog a chance to approach you and sniff the back of your hand
  - Observe the "body language" of the dog
- ☛ *Protect yourself from attack*
  - Don't turn your back on the dog
  - If the dog looks threatening, command him a firm voice to sit
  - Use handheld articles for protection - let them bit the article rather than your hand or arm
  - Don't run unless you think you can beat the dog to an exit
- ☛ *Defend against a dog attack*
  - Yell to attract attention
  - Shield your neck and face with your arm
  - Extend your arm as a target - retract at the last possible moment if the dog leaps
  - Try to knee the dog in the chest or deliver a hard kick
  - Focus on the dog's areas of vulnerability - nose, throat, rib cage

## Training Resources:

- ☛ The canine units of most law enforcement agencies, can provide the information on handling dogs. They may also be willing to provide limited training resources.
- ☛ Military K-9 units can provide information on handling and training dogs.
- ☛ Most Humane Societies provide information on handling dogs. In some instances they provide obedience classes which may offer some insight into dealing with potential dog attacks.

## **Video Discussion Guide**

### **Home Contact**

1. Discuss the officers' approach to the residence. Include in your discussion field attire, equipment, and positioning (both inside and outside the residence).
2. Was there effective use of the "contact/cover" strategy in this situation? If yes, cite examples. If no, what could the officers have done differently?
3. Once the suspected "cocaine" was in plain view, what options were available to the officers?
4. What weapons were readily available to either the offender or his girlfriend during this encounter?
5. Did the "contact" officer attempt to use verbal or nonverbal techniques to diffuse the situation? If so, cite examples. If not, what could he/she have done differently to diffuse this confrontation?
6. Once they were confronted both verbally and physically by the girlfriend, what options were open to the officers?
7. What was the role of the "cover" officer during the confrontation with the girlfriend?
8. Discuss other areas of concern.



# Health & Safety

## LEARNING OBJECTIVES

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# HEALTH AND SAFETY

---

By the end of this section you will be able to...

- outline an officer *medical and family history* form
- list three area in which officers should receive *testing and vaccinations*
- list six pieces of *safety apparel* that should be provided by the agency
- discuss issues of *notification of physical and pharmacological conditions*
- discuss issues of *random drug screening*
- discuss issues of *establishing an exposure control plan*
- discuss issues of *establishing a departmental investigation policy*

# HEALTH SAFETY

**OBJECTIVE:** Recognize and determine health safety issues.

## ► MEDICAL AND FAMILY HISTORY INFORMATION<sup>71</sup>


LEHIGH COUNTY PROBATION AND PAROLE FAMILY/MEDICAL INFORMATION	
EMERGENCY INFORMATION	OPTIONAL INFORMATION
Name _____	Spouse/Significant Other Name _____
Position _____	Employer _____
Home Address _____	Address _____
Home Telephone # _____	Telephone # _____
Birth date _____ Soc. Sec. # _____	Children - Name/Age School Tel. #
Blood Type _____ RH Factor _____	_____
Medical Concerns/Allergies/Medications _____	_____
_____	_____
Hospital Preference _____	Other Information _____
Health Insurance/Secondary Insurance _____	_____
_____	_____
Hospital Insurance Plan(s) _____	_____
Address _____	_____
Policy Number(s) _____	_____
Medical Insurance Plan(s) _____	_____
Address _____	_____
Family Doctor _____	_____
Address _____	_____
Telephone # _____	_____
Emergency Contact Person _____	_____
Telephone # _____	_____
_____	_____
I understand that providing this information is optional. It shall be kept confidential and shall be used in the event of a critical incident and/or a medical emergency for the purpose of notification and/or medical treatment.	
Employee's Signature _____	Date _____

---

► **TESTING AND VACCINATIONS FOR INFECTIOUS DISEASE**

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- Annual tuberculosis testing<sup>72</sup>
- Hepatitis B Vaccination with Titer<sup>73</sup>
- Tetanus Vaccination<sup>74</sup>



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► **SAFETY APPAREL**

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
- |                  |                   |
|------------------|-------------------|
| • Ear Protection | • Gowns           |
| • Eye Protection | • Latex Gloves    |
| • Face Masks     | • Soft Body Armor |

---

► **NOTIFICATION OF PHYSICAL AND PHARMACOLOGICAL CONDITIONS**

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Officers should be required to notify a supervisor of any physical or pharmacological conditions causing physical and/or emotional impairment. Impairment is defined as a condition which can affect judgement, reaction time or motor skills.



---

<sup>72</sup> Health care professionals recommend the *Mantoux Method* tuberculosis skin test given at least annually. New Jersey Medical School National Tuberculosis Center Homepage, 1996. (<http://www.umdnj.edu/~ntbcweb/q&aintro.htm>)

<sup>73</sup> If you are not immune to hepatitis B, no hepatitis B surface antibody, you should receive three doses of hepatitis B vaccine. Six months thereafter, a hepatitis titer test should be performed to determine the antibody presence and level. The Hepatitis Information Network HomePage, 1996. (<http://www.hepnet.com>)

<sup>74</sup> Tetanus toxoid should be given with diphtheria toxoid as Td every ten years. If a dose is given sooner as part of wound management, the next booster is not needed until ten years after. Center for Disease Control Prevention Guidelines HomePage, 1996. (<http://www.wonder.cdc.gov/wonder/prevguid/p0000238/body0008.htm>)

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**▶ RANDOM DRUG SCREENING PROGRAM**

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*The Supreme Court has ruled that the testing of officers who carry firearms is reasonable despite the absence of a requirement of probable cause or of some level of individualized suspicion.<sup>75</sup>*

The intent of a random drug screening program is to:

- establish an audit trail for officers in case of accusation
- ensure that officers are physically fit and have unimpeachable integrity and judgement.
- invoke a compelling interest and duty in preventing the risk to the health, safety and life of the citizenry posed by the potential use of force by persons suffering from impaired perception and judgement.

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**▶ EXPOSURE CONTROL PLAN<sup>76</sup>**

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- Officers are entitled to a post-exposure evaluation and follow-up.
- Disposable gloves, gowns and face masks should be available to officers and should be worn whenever splashes, spray, splatter or droplets of blood, urine or other potentially infectious materials may be generated and eye, nose or mouth contamination can be reasonably anticipated.
- Hand-washing facilities should be readily available for officers. For officers who are in the field, towelettes are available.
- Containers for the storage of urine or other potentially infectious materials should be containers that prevent leakage during collection, handling, storage, processing or transport.
- Confiscated items which may contain blood or other potentially infectious materials shall be placed in a sharp container (needles) or leak proof bag (items which will not puncture).

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<sup>75</sup> National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 103 L.Ed.2d 685 (1989).

<sup>76</sup> Refer to regulations and guidelines promulgated by the U. S. Department of Labor, Occupational Safety and Hazard Administration (OSHA).

# **APPA POSITION STATEMENT ON COMMUNICABLE DISEASES**

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## **► INTRODUCTION**

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Probation and Parole professionals are at increased health risk for contracting certain communicable diseases. With the increase in the number of individuals on probation and parole, combined with the lack of meaningful health care available to many of them, we in community corrections must remain cognizant of the dangers of exposure to certain communicable diseases. Probation and Parole personnel work in and visit environments that may be conducive to the spread of these diseases. Therefore, community correctional agencies must do all they can to minimize the health risks to staff while still allowing personnel to perform their duties effectively.

## **POSITION**

The American Probation and Parole Association considers the health of its members a critical issue and recommends that all probation and parole agencies have programs in place to assess the risk of communicable diseases; to train staff about the risks of such diseases as well as how to avoid them and how to treat them; to maintain clear and decisive policies and procedures pertaining to potential exposures to communicable diseases; and to investigate and respond to all incidents involving exposure or potential exposure.

All probation and parole departments should comply with OSHA's Bloodborne Pathogens Standard CFR 1910.1030, OSHA's Occupational Exposure to Tuberculosis Enforcement Guidelines and the U.S. Centers for Disease Control guidelines on Tuberculosis, Occupational Exposure to HIV and Hepatitis B and C.

Consistent with federal guidelines, APPA supports the mandatory purchase of any and all equipment necessary to protect staff and reduce the risk of exposure to communicable diseases.

## **RECOMMENDED ACTION**

APPA recommends that each probation and parole agency establish a Health and Safety Committee that includes all levels of staff to develop guidelines that meet the needs of their particular agency. The guidelines should include, but not be limited to the following guidelines:

### **1. TUBERCULOSIS (TB)**

Guidelines should include 4 elements to TB control:

- Testing – establish a comprehensive skin testing program with appropriate follow up of those who tested positive. The appropriate test is the Mantoux PPD. The test identifies those employees at risk of disease due to latent TB infection. Testing should be conducted on a yearly basis. As per OSHA Enforcement Directive, a two step baseline shall be used for new employees whose initial PPD results are negative, but have not had a documented negative test during the preceding twelve months. The test should be offered at a time and location convenient for employees. Follow up evaluation and treatment, where necessary, are to be offered at no cost to the employee.
- Prevention – prevent the spread of TB by encouraging the early identification, isolation and treatment of people with active TB as well as identifying new converters. Probationers and parolees released from jails and correctional facilities should be included if they are known or suspected to have active TB, as well as those who are on preventative or active TB therapy.
- Education – prevent exposure to TB through employee education. A training program should be established that includes but is not necessarily limited to explaining the differences between latent TB infection and TB disease, mode of transmission, signs and symptoms, history of TB, TB testing, TB control, the relationship between TB and HIV infection and Multi-drug Resistant (MDR) TB.
- Building Examination – conduct an examination of physical plants to determine proper design and maintenance of ventilation systems. A review to determine the need for a study of personal protective equipment should also be considered.

## 2. HEPATITIS A, HEPATITIS B (HBV) AND HEPATITIS C

Guidelines should include 2 elements for Hepatitis control:

- Training – Hepatitis A, B and C are bodily fluid viruses. The community corrections' population is classified as high risk due to the rate of drug abuse. Training curricula should include transmission of Hepatitis A, B and C (formerly known as non-A non-B Hepatitis), symptoms, who is at risk, personal protection, universal precautions, and an explanation of the HBV vaccine. There is currently no vaccine to prevent hepatitis C.
- Vaccination A and HBV – establish and encourage an agency sponsored vaccination program. The vaccine should be offered to all personnel who

have the possibility of direct physical contact with offender population. The vaccine should be offered on a voluntary basis with provisions to offer it periodically to those who may initially decline it but subsequently change their mind. An antibody test must be offered within two months following completion of the vaccination series. The vaccination and the antibody test should be offered at no cost to the employee.

### 3. AIDS / HIV

Guidelines should include 4 elements to AIDS / HIV control:

- Training – HIV is a virus carried in bodily fluid. As with HBV, the community corrections' population is classified as high risk. While transmission does not occur from every contact with infected bodily fluid, the fact that infection frequently results in death makes HIV a serious threat. Training curriculums should include modes of transmission, post-exposure procedures, prevention, personal protection, who is at risk and universal precautions.
- Universal Precautions – all blood exposure is to be treated as if the blood is contaminated.
- Post Exposure Procedures – if someone is exposed to blood, i.e. stuck with a needle, it is to be assumed that it is contaminated. A post exposure plan must be in place that includes clean up, immediate medical treatment for exposed employees (to be strongly encouraged, but not mandatory), post exposure evaluation and a determination of source patient and counseling. A mechanism must be in place to provide post-exposure prophylaxis within two hours of exposure at no cost to the employee. Written agreements with local health care providers are an effective way to accomplish this.
- Confidentiality – jails and prisons must provide probation and parole agencies with information regarding the HIV status of offenders released to their supervision. Legislation that would allow probation and parole agencies to disclose HIV status to the offenders' victims and family or friends with whom a probationer/parolee will reside should be supported. The federal Ryan White Act and various state laws should be considered.



# DEPARTMENTAL INVESTIGATIONS

**OBJECTIVE:** To develop a proactive process to ensure the quality of service delivery, community and staff safety, and liability protection.

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## ► **Purpose**

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- improvement of training
- ensure that the department and each staff member has unimpeachable integrity and judgement
- an obligation to hold itself (the department) and its staff accountable, explain and review its actions

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## ► **Control of Person Incident Canon**

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- nothing routine in a control of person incident and use of force
- force is an unusual procedure
- physical force beyond a passive resister must be reviewed
- officers shall file a written incident report

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► **Incidents Requiring Investigation**

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- violation in the department's code of conduct or declaration of values
- engaging in prohibited activities or conduct
- involved in a control of person incident beyond passive resister
- use or displaying of a firearm
- involved on or off-duty as a witness or actor in an alleged criminal act
- subject of a citizen's complaint

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► **Departmental Investigation Process**

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- notification of department administrator
- supervisor assignment to conduct a preliminary review
- oral submission of preliminary review within 24 hours
- administrator's review actions

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► **Administrator's Review Actions**

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- participation in an EAP
- administratively preclude process
- order a debriefing
- order a departmental investigation
- convene a departmental review board
- suspension pending disciplinary investigation

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► **DEPARTMENTAL INVESTIGATION (GARRITY RULE)<sup>77</sup>**

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- The constitutional right to remain silent does not apply to departmental investigations.
- The statement below should be *WRITTEN ABOVE ANY* report an officer is ordered to write by the Department. This insures that the report can only be used against the officer in internal investigations and not used later should criminal charges of any type follow.

"It is my understanding that this report is made for administrative, probation department purposes only and will not be used as part of an official investigation. This report is made by me after being ordered to do so by lawful supervisory officers. It is my understanding that by refusing to obey an order to write this report that I can be disciplined for insubordination and that the punishment for insubordination can be up to and include termination of employment. This report is made only pursuant to such orders and the potential punishment or discipline that can result for failure to obey that order."

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<sup>77</sup> Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 S. Ct. 493 (1967)

# Critical Incident Stress Management

## LEARNING OBJECTIVES

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# CRITICAL INCIDENT STRESS MANAGEMENT (CISM)

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By the end of this section, you will be able to:

- define a *stress response* and the *symptoms of distress*
- assess how effectively you cope with stress by utilizing a *health education survey*
- identify *common signs and symptoms* of excessive stress
- define *Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD)* and early warnings of possible PTSD
- discuss the *key concepts of CISM*
- define a *Critical Incident Stress Debriefing (CISD)* and incorporate the seven stage intervention process
- incorporate the *key concepts of CISD* when responding to a critical incident
- describe and utilize the components of a *Defusing*
- define a *Demobilization* and discuss the key concepts
- explain the process of *establishing a CISD Team*
- recognize the *serious mistakes* which cause harm to the participants in a debriefing

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## ► **STRESS RESPONSE DEFINITION<sub>1</sub>**

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***STRESS RESPONSE*** is a non-specific response to any demand. Stress consists of a well known combination of neurologic, neuroendocrine, and endocrine arousal response mechanisms that can affect and alter every organ and function of the human body. Stress accelerates the aging process as we know it. Dr. Hans Selye once said stress is the sum total of “wear and tear” on the body.

## ***STRESS = AROUSAL***

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## **SYMPTOMS OF DISTRESS<sub>2</sub>**

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Most people know when they are experiencing excessive levels of stress arousal. The manner in which we are alerted to such a condition of distress may be through the development of symptoms of excessive stress. Listed below are numerous potentially stress-related symptoms that people experience.

***“When I am under a great deal of stress, I experience:”***

***Headaches***  
***Irregular heart beat***  
***Muscle spasms***  
***Gastrointestinal problems***  
***Vertigo***  
***High blood pressure***  
***Low blood pressure***  
***Fatigue***  
***Difficulty concentrating***  
***Feeling overwhelmed***  
***Cynicism, negativism***

***Anger, irritability***  
***Difficulty falling asleep***  
***Difficulty staying asleep***  
***Sadness / depression***  
***Increased appetite***  
***Decreased appetite***  
***Rashes and hives***  
***Feelings of helplessness***  
***Feelings of hopelessness***  
***Apathy***  
***Increased use of alcohol***  
***and/or tobacco***

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<sup>1</sup> Mitchell, Jeffrey T. and George S. Everly, Jr., *Critical Incident Stress Management: The Basic Course Workbook*, International Critical Incident Stress Foundation, 1996.

<sup>2</sup> Mitchell and Everly, op cit.

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## ► HEALTH EDUCATION SURVEY<sub>3</sub>

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There are many ways to cope with the stress in your life. Some coping techniques are more effective than others. The purpose of this checklist is to help you assess how effectively you cope with stress. Upon completing this checklist, you will have identified many of the ways you choose to cope with stress, while at the same time, through a point system, ascertain the relative desirability of the coping techniques that you now employ. This is a health education survey not a clinical assessment instrument. Its sole purpose is to inform you of how you cope with the stress in your life.

In order to complete the checklist, simply follow the instructions given for each of the 14 items listed below. When you have completed all of the 14 items, place your total score in the space provided.

- \_\_\_\_\_ 1. Give yourself 10 points if you feel that you have a supportive family.
- \_\_\_\_\_ 2. Give yourself 10 points if you actively pursue a hobby.
- \_\_\_\_\_ 3. Give yourself 10 points if you belong to some social or activity group that meets at least once a month (other than your family).
- \_\_\_\_\_ 4. Give yourself 15 points if you are within five pounds of your "ideal" body weight, considering your height and bone structure.
- \_\_\_\_\_ 5. Give yourself 15 points if you practice some form of "deep relaxation" at least three times a week. Deep relaxation exercises include meditation, imagery, yoga, etc.
- \_\_\_\_\_ 6. Give yourself 5 points for each time you exercise 30 minutes or longer during the course of an average week.
- \_\_\_\_\_ 7. Give yourself 5 points for each nutritionally balanced and wholesome meal you consume during the course of an average day.
- \_\_\_\_\_ 8. Give yourself 10 points for each time you do something you really enjoy, "just for yourself," during the course of an average week.
- \_\_\_\_\_ 9. Give yourself 10 points if you have some place in your home that you can go to in order to relax and/or be by yourself.
- \_\_\_\_\_ 10. Give yourself 10 points if you practice time management techniques in your daily life.
- \_\_\_\_\_ 11. Subtract 10 points for each pack of cigarettes you smoke during the course of an average day.
- \_\_\_\_\_ 12. Subtract 5 points for each evening during the course of an average week that you take any form of medication or chemical substance (including alcohol) to help you sleep.
- \_\_\_\_\_ 13. Subtract 10 points for each during the course of an average week that you consume any form of medication or chemical substance (including alcohol) to reduce your anxiety or just calm you down.

- \_\_\_\_\_ 14. Subtract 5 points for each evening during the course of an average week that you bring work home; work that was meant to be done at your place of employment.

===== **TOTAL SCORE**

Now that you've calculated your score, consider that the higher your score, the greater your health-promoting coping practices. A "perfect" score would be around 115. Scores in the 50-60 range are probably adequate to cope with most common sources of stress.

Also keep in mind that items 1-10 represent adaptive health-promoting coping strategies, and items 11-14 represent maladaptive, health deteriorating coping strategies. These maladaptive strategies are self-sustaining because they do provide at least some temporary relief from stress. In the long run, however, their utilization serves to erode one's health. Ideally, health-promoting coping strategies (1-10) are the best to integrate into your lifestyle and will ultimately prove to be an effective preventive program against excessive stress.

This exercise was developed by Dr. George S. Everly, Jr., *International Critical Incident Stress Foundation, Inc.*, 1996.

***NOTES:***



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► **COMMON SIGNS & SYMPTOMS - EXCESSIVE STRESS.**

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***Cognitive***

Confusion in thinking  
Difficulty making decisions  
Disorientation

***Physical***

Excessive sweating  
Dizzy spells  
Increased heart rate  
Elevated blood pressure  
Rapid breathing

***Emotional***

Emotional shock  
Anger  
Grief  
Depression  
Feeling overwhelmed  
Hopelessness  
Helplessness

***Behavioral***

Changes in ordinary behavior  
patterns  
Changes in eating  
Decreased personal hygiene  
Withdrawal from others  
Prolonged silences

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► **POST-TRAUMATIC STRESS DISORDER (PTSD)**  
**DEFINITION<sup>5</sup>**

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*Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD)* is the term applied as the official diagnosis of a post-traumatic stress syndrome which is characterized by symptoms of:

- a. excessive excitability and arousal,
- b. numbing withdrawal, and avoidance, and
- c. repetitive, intrusive memories or recollections of the trauma and/or events related to the trauma,
- d. duration of at least 1 month.

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► **EARLY WARNING SIGNS OF POSSIBLE PTSD<sup>6</sup>**

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- Flashbacks
- Traumatic dreams
- Memory disturbances
- Persistent intrusive recollections of the trauma
- Self-medication (e.g., alcohol abuse)
- Anger, irritability, hostility which is difficult to control
- Persistent depression, withdrawal
- A “dazed” or “numb” appearance
- Panic attacks
- Phobia formation

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<sup>5</sup> Mitchell and Everly, op cit.  
<sup>6</sup> I bid.

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## ► KEY CONCEPTS OF CISM<sub>7</sub>

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Critical Incident Stress Management (CISM) is a comprehensive, organized approach for the reduction and control of harmful aspects of stress. The key concepts of CISM include the following elements:

- Comprehensive
- Larger picture
- CISM concerns the support of personnel within an organization
- CISD is only one technique of CISM
- Core of CISM remains the same even though specific applications may vary from locality to locality
- All aspects of the organization should be involved in CISM
- Administrative support is vital
- CISM must be addressed in the CISD basic training program
- CISM needs to be taught in all types of training within the organization
- CISM should be a matter of accepted policy within the organization
- CISM's aims are simple:
  - a. Maintain health and productivity
  - b. Prevent traumatic stress effects
  - c. Mitigate stress effects
  - d. Restore personal to normal functions
  - e. Speed recovery from stress
  - f. Enhance to overall environment in which the person works and lives
- CISM issues should transcend administrative / supervision / operational / union / management / territorial / political, and organizational issues.

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## ► **CRITICAL INCIDENT STRESS DEBRIEFING (CISD) DEFINITION AND 7-STAGE INTERVENTION PROCESS**

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The CISD and defusing processes may be defined as group meetings or discussions about a traumatic event, or series of traumatic events. The CISD and defusing processes are solidly based in crisis intervention theory and educational intervention theory. The CISD and defusing processes are designed to mitigate the psychological impact of a traumatic event, prevent the subsequent development of a post-traumatic syndrome, and serve as an early identification mechanism for individuals who will require professional mental health follow-up subsequent to a traumatic event. Usually 2-3 hours in length.

The formal CISD process is a seven stage intervention. These stages are delineated as follows:

### *Stages of CISD*

#### Objectives

Stage 1	Introduction	To introduce intervention team members, explain process, set expectations.
Stage 2	Fact	To describe traumatic event from each participant's perspective on a cognitive level.
Stage 3	Thought	To allow participants to describe cognitive reactions and to transition to emotional reactions.
Stage 4	Reaction	To identify the most traumatic aspect of the event for the participants and identify emotional reactions.
Stage 5	Symptom	To identify personal symptoms of distress and transition back to cognitive level.
Stage 6	Teaching	To educate as to normal reactions and adaptive coping mechanisms, ie, stress management. Provide cognitive anchor.
Stage 7	Re-Entry	To clarify ambiguities and prepare for termination.

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## ► KEY CONCEPTS OF CISD,

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The key concepts of CISD consist of the following elements:

- Not therapy
- Structured conversation or discussion of traumatic event
- Goals:
  1. Mitigate impact of a horrible event
  2. Accelerate normal recovery processes in normal people who are experiencing normal reactions to totally abnormal events
- Peer and mental health combination is essential:
  - ***Mental health professional always required***
  - Peer always required in emergency services, hospital based, military, and disaster field workers debriefings
  - Peer not always required for commercial, business and industrial settings depending on circumstances
- **ALL** CISD team members must be CISD trained regardless of background and other types of training.
- Seven (7) phase process:
  1. INTRODUCTION
  2. FACT
  3. THOUGHT
  4. REACTION
  5. SYMPTOMS
  6. TEACHING
  7. RE-ENTRY
- Three hours or less
- All team members active in process
- Avoid probing
- Do not ask too many questions

***KEY CONCEPTS OF CISD (continued)***

- Facilitate group discussion
- Do not aim at getting individuals to disclose personal information
- Focus on participants needs not team's needs
- Do not argue with perceptions
- Provide information and people can change their own perceptions
- Deal only with material brought out by participants
- Avoid detailed operational or investigative information
- CISD is not a critique of the incident
- Stick to the model
- Keep the process moving
- Confidentiality is vital
- Do not take notes
- Provide follow up
- Reserve debriefing for serious events
- Remember the group is normal not pathological
- Keep debriefing conversational and flowing
- Do not theorize, moralize, psychologically interpret, or judge
- Instead team should listen, stabilize, inform, normalize, recover
- Do not engage in telling "war stories"
- Team talks actively - beginning and ending; less in reaction phase
- Teach according to the needs of the group

***KEY CONCEPTS OF CISD (continued)***

- Immediate follow up with the most seriously affected personnel
- ***Be familiar with and follow the guidelines in the CISD manual***

***NOTES:***

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## ► DEFUSING DEFINITION AND COMPONENTS<sup>10</sup>

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A shortened version of the debriefing. Usually 20-45 minutes in length. A defusing is best applied within eight (8) hours of an incident. If possible, it should be provided immediately (1-2 hours) after the incident. Examples of usual target groups are engine companies, ambulance crews, emergency room staff, police squads, tactical units, and specialty teams. Goals of a defusing consist of mitigating the impact of the event, accelerate the recovery process, assessment tool for determining the need for debriefings and other services, and reduce cognitive, emotional, and physiological symptoms.

The components of a *defusing* include the following:

- **INTRODUCTION** - facilitator introduces team, states the purpose of the defusing, motivates participation, sets rules, comments on confidentiality, clarifies the process is not investigative, emphasizes finishing the process, states goals, describes the process, and offers additional support;
- **EXPLORATION** - facilitator asks personnel (participants) to describe what just happened, complete minimal clarifying questions, express experiences and reactions, assess need for more help, reassure as necessary;
- **INFORMATION** - accept / summarize their (participants) exploration, normalize experiences and/or reactions, teach multiple stress survival skills, diet / avoid various substances, emphasize rest / family life and recreation / exercise.

### ***NOTES:***



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## ► DEMOBILIZATION DEFINITION AND KEY CONCEPTS<sub>11</sub>

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A **demobilization** is a quick informational and rest session applied when operations units have been released from services at a major incident which requires over 100 personnel. It serves a secondary function as a screening opportunity to assure that individuals who may need assistance are identified early after the traumatic event. The time element for a demobilization consists of a 10 minute information session from a CISD Team member followed by 20 minutes for food and rest. A demobilization is best applied immediately after work teams have been released from the major incident and before personnel return to normal duties.

The *key concepts* of a demobilization are as follows:

- Reserved for a large scale event
- Must be followed by a debriefing within a few days
- Must be provided by trained CISD team members
- Never provided at the scene
- Mental health professional need not be present
- One work team after another is processed until all of the personnel involved in the situation have been processed
- Once the demobilization is complete, personnel do not return to the incident. Instead they return to routine duties or they go home if their duty time is complete
- Keep remarks very brief. Only provide the basic information necessary to hold the personnel together until more definitive work such as a debriefing can be done
- Instruct personnel about interactions with loved ones at home who may be distressed by the incident
- Instruct personnel how to obtain help if they need it before the debriefing is provided
- Be available to personnel if they would like to discuss the incident privately
- Assure that command staff also receive support

***KEY CONCEPTS OF DEMOBILIZATION (continued)***

- Provide low fat, low sugar, low salt foods which have complex carbohydrates in the food service area
- Avoid caffeine products in food service
- Allow commanders (administrators) to announce the next steps for the personnel after the demobilization concludes to food and rest phase
- Be familiar with demobilization material in the *CISD: An Operations Manual*

***NOTES:***

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## ► **PROCEDURES TO ESTABLISH CISD TEAMS<sub>12</sub>**

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- A. Establish the need for a team. Count the number of major events which had a serious emotional impact on personnel over the last five years. If it averages five or six a year, a team is indicated. If less, a regional based team would be best for your community. If more, a team is definitely needed in your area.
- B. Gain support from the administration to investigate the need for and the possibility of a team in the administration area. If the boss can be convinced that a team is a good idea and throws support behind it, it is easier to put it together.
- C. Talk to local mental health professionals and see there is interest in this type of community service project.
- D. Form a task force of peer support personnel and mental health professionals to develop the team.
- E. Gather information about CISD team development. Review what other communities have done. Try to avoid reinventing the CISD wheel.
- F. Solicit financial support from agencies and the private sector to cover the costs of training the team.
- G. Send out applications for team membership. (Several states already have an application process. Review theirs and see if it fits your needs.) Separate professional and peer support applications may be necessary.
- H. Review applications and select those who have the best potential to work on the team. Don't promise anyone a place on the team until initial training is complete.
- I. Arrange for training of the team. (Sometimes this is done much earlier in the process to assure timely start up of the team.)
- J. Provide training. This should be a minimum of two days and should be identical to the training provided to the other CISD teams.
- K. Establish the leadership on the team.
- L. Develop written operating procedures for the team. *See CISD: An Operations Manual.*
- M. Continue to train the newly formed team with items not covered in the initial training.

***Procedures to Establish CISD Teams (continued)***

- N. Set up regular meetings of the team to help maintain the interest and assure proper distribution of information.
- O. Review CISD incidents to determine needs for improvement.

***NOTES:***

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## ► **SERIOUS CISD MISTAKES<sub>13</sub>**

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If a debriefing is going to fail, it is likely to fail on one of the following items. Some of these mistakes can cause harm to the participants in a debriefing. All of these mistakes should be carefully avoided.

- Using untrained CISD team members
- Not using mental health professionals in a debriefing
- Misunderstanding the CISD process which progresses from strongly cognitive. (***Introduction*** and ***Fact*** phases) to a transition phase from cognition to affect (***Thought*** phase) to a strongly affective phase (***Reaction***) and finally back through a transition phase (***Symptoms***) to cognition phases again (***Teaching*** and ***Re-Entry***). *See the table below:*

INTRODUCTION----->	Cognitive
FACT----->	Cognitive
THOUGHT----->	Cognitive to Affective
REACTION----->	Affective
SYMPTOMS----->	Affective to Cognitive
TEACHING----->	Cognitive
RE-ENTRY----->	Cognitive

- Attempting to turn CISD into psychotherapy
- Attempting to substitute CISD for psychotherapy
- Not utilizing CISD trained peers for emergency, hospital, military or other operational groups
- Not preparing adequately for the debriefing
- Not arriving early enough to circulate around and meet the participants
- Not doing an adequate case review

### ***Serious CISD Mistakes (continued)***

- Not having a CISD team strategy meeting before the debriefing
- Picking a team full of inexperienced debriefers
- Picking a team member with significant current personal problems
- Not providing appropriate follow up services for CISD
- Not meeting after a debriefing to make sure the CISD team is okay
- Not assessing the need for appropriate CISD (under use of the process)
- Over using CISD by utilizing the process on minor events
- Not following the CISD model
- Altering the CISD model
- Telling "war stories" during a debriefing
- Team members not periodically looking at each other during the debriefing in order to communicate with their eyes
- Writing notes during a debriefing
- Arguing with the participants
- Acting or speaking in a manner which indicates insensitivity to the participants
- Bringing up information from other debriefings
- Breaking confidentiality

## IMPORTANT CISD TRAINING RESOURCES

Mitchell, J.T. and Everly, G.S., Jr. (1996). *Critical Incident Stress Management: The Basic Course Workbook*. Ellicott City, MD: International Critical Incident Stress Foundation, Inc.

Mitchell, J.T. and Everly, G.S., Jr. (1996). *Critical Incident Stress Debriefing (CISD): An Operations Manual for the Prevention of Traumatic Stress Among Emergency Services and Disaster Workers, 2<sup>nd</sup> Edition Revised*. Ellicott City, MD: Chevron Publishing Corp.

Mitchell, J.T. and Everly, G.S., Jr. (1994). *Human Elements Training*. Ellicott City, MD: Chevron Publishing Corp.

*CISD: Critical Incident Stress Debriefing: Techniques of Debriefing* (1991). Video Tape by J.T. Mitchell. St. Louis, MO: Mosby Publishing.

International Critical Incident Stress Foundation, Inc.  
10176 Baltimore National Pike, Unit 201  
Ellicott City, Maryland 21042  
(410) 750-9600 (*Routine*)  
(410) 313-2473 (*Emergency*)  
(410) 750-9601 (*Fax*)

# Developing Safety Training



## LEARNING OBJECTIVES

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# DEVELOPING SAFETY TRAINING

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By the end of this Section, you will be able to...

- identify the steps for developing an *effective safety training* program in your organization

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## STEPS FOR DEVELOPING EFFECTIVE SAFETY TRAINING

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### *CONDUCT:*

1. **Mental Awareness Training:**  
Lecture Format
2. **Individual Skills Training:**  
Tell--Show--Do Format  
(Begin with lowest level on USE OF FORCE Continuum)
3. **Simulation Training:**  
Relevant Scenarios of Increasing Difficulty

### *PROVIDE:*

4. **Observation Based Feedback:**  
Instructor observations and video feedback
5. **Periodic Skills Refresher Training**

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# **SAFETY FLOW CHART**

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## **JOB TASKS**

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- List jobs that officers are required to perform such as field contacts, take UA's, electronic monitoring, etc.

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## **SAFETY ISSUES**

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- For each of the job tasks listed identify the safety issues involved in performing that particular job function.

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## **EQUIPMENT**

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- What equipment will officers need to perform the job tasks and meet the safety issues identified.
- Is the equipment provided the best type or model to do the job. No piece of equipment is effective if it is not used.

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## **IMPLEMENTATION**

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- Identify how officers will learn to effectively use the equipment, i.e. through demonstration, simulation training, etc.
- Determine how the agency will monitor to determine the effectiveness of the training and equipment.

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## **SAFETY SIMULATION TRAINING™**

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### **Introduction**

The Safety Simulation Training program (SST) represents the latest in safety training concepts. SST is a comprehensive approach to safety training that developed as a continuation of previously offered lecture and interactive training packages. The goal of SST is to provide current, practical safety training and to deliver this training using cost efficient, state-of-the-art methods and technologies. SST will provide agencies the opportunity for an ongoing dialogue regarding the latest safety issues and continued individualized training development.

This simulation-based training program is designed to allow Corrections agencies to take officer safety training from classroom theory to a real world setting. The curriculum package was designed to support the issues and concepts that were originally introduced in our previous Officer and Staff Safety programs.

This package can also provide agency trainers with a detailed and thorough presentation to conduct simulation-based training in their agency. Trainers are provided with a discussion of the philosophy and purpose of simulation-based training. This discussion takes into account the fact that some agencies have some experience in conducting these types of programs while for others, this training will be a new experience.

Following this discussion, trainers and administrators will be able to review information regarding the "logistics" of simulation-based training. Those who have conducted these programs in the past realize that they are quite "unlike" most of the safety training officers had previously received. While we provide a number of scenarios in the package, agencies are free to "tailor" these scenarios or create new ones in order to more accurately reflect their specific needs and concerns. In addition, simulation-based training presents a whole new set of challenges for trainers and participants. In a very real sense, simulation-based training "raises the stakes" for everyone. Trainers will find that their role may be more of a facilitator while participants' role will be far more interactive.

After reviewing the philosophy, purpose and logistics of this package program, trainers and/or participants are presented with various scenarios. These scenarios simulate field settings, office settings, and home contacts. The backgrounds for each of these scenarios were taken from actual

incidents reported by state, federal and county probation and pretrial services officers. One should keep in mind that the goal in simulation-based training is to create as realistic a setting as possible for officers; strive for win-win situations in order to facilitate learning and constructively critique an officer's performance without being judgmental.

Forms are provided in this package for trainers to critique an officer's performance immediately following the completion of a scenario. The critique is done in conjunction with video playback as each simulation is taped to provide immediate, objective review of the participant's performance.

Evaluations are also provided for participants to critique the training sessions. In order for agencies to build a comprehensive, practical and effective long-term safety training program it is imperative that these performance critiques and evaluations are completed in a constructive and honest fashion. Information is also provided to trainers on how to conduct debriefing sessions immediately following a scenario and with the larger groups of officers at the completion of the training. As trainers will learn, it is during these debriefing periods that many of the objectives of the session are brought together. Successful debriefing sessions are critical to the success of any simulation-based program.

Having provided you with a brief introduction about the Simulation Safety Training program package, we'll now turn to the philosophy and purpose behind simulation-based training.

### Simulation-based Training: Philosophy and Purpose

Regardless of how much classroom training an individual has received, one of the true measures of that individual's learning is whether or not he or she can apply what they have learned. This is not said to minimize the importance of what takes place in the classroom. To the contrary, it is critical to the success of any simulation-based program to thoroughly explain and discuss theories and concepts so that students have a framework within which they can assess a situation, decide on a course of action and then act. The philosophy behind simulation-based training deals with the need to apply, in a practical setting, the theories and concepts that are addressed in an academic setting. An analogy for this would be the scientific community.

Scientists conduct research that is often driven by theories. Research studies are conducted in order to test these theories. Theories that are not supported via these studies may either be

modified or perhaps abandoned completely. Theories that are never tested provide little in the way of real-world information. The same example can be applied to simulation-based training. Teaching a concept of officer and staff safety in a structured environment is necessary to establish a foundation, just as a theory provides a foundation for scientific research. However, it is the practical application of this concept that either reinforces the concept or causes us to perhaps modify the concept. The value of a training program that indulges only theories and concepts, and never provides the opportunity for practical testing of those theories and concepts, will always be in question.

From this discussion it is easy to discern the purpose for conducting simulation-based training. These types of training programs provide the opportunity to apply what officers have studied, in a simulated real-world setting. Simulation-based programs take the next logical step in the development of sound and effective safety practices by allowing officers to "put it all together." Quite often, the result is the realization by officers that they still have much to learn. In one respect the old adage about experience being the best teacher can certainly be applied here. Adults (and children) generally learn best by "doing"; simulation-based training supports that educational position.

#### Simulation-based Training: A Logistical Discussion

Early on in this discussion, three goals of simulation-based training were identified for trainers.

These goals were:

- 1) to create as realistic a setting as possible for each scenario,
- 2) strive to create win-win situations in order to facilitate learning, and
- 3) constructively critique performance while not being judgmental.

Each of these goals will now be discussed in greater detail.

#### Training Goal #1

##### "Create as realistic a setting as possible"

Not only do officers need to apply what they have learned but they need to do so in a setting that closely resembles their real world. Creating a realistic setting allows both officers and trainers to get a "true reading" on just how an officer might respond in an actual situation. The realistic setting also has the tendency to create a certain amount of stress for the officers which is

also a realistic and desirable response. When conducting simulation-programs, whether you use the SST scenarios or create your own, the degree of realism that you will experience is dependent upon three factors: the actual setting, the actors used in the scenarios, and the officers/participants.

### The Actual Setting

While the physical setting for your scenarios need not be elaborate, it is always helpful to include enough props to give the appearance of realism. If the setting is an offender/defendant's home, try to make arrangements to obtain some furniture that one may find in a home. The main issue is to create a setting that resembles the officers actual work environment.

### The Actors

Many law enforcement departments and community correction offices who have conducted simulation-based training use other officers, preferably not known to the participants, as role players for these programs. This is generally a good idea. Other officers understand the purpose behind this type of training and because they have a frame of reference for the type of situations depicted, they can usually bring a good deal of realism to the role. Trainers should be alert, however, to several concerns that need to be addressed when selecting actors for these programs.

One of the most important points to convey to anyone who will be playing a role during the exercises is that they are also "trainers." This means that their ultimate goal is to contribute to the officers' learning. Their goal should not be to embarrass or humiliate anyone. This is not the time for role players to "show off" their knowledge and expertise at the expense of the participants.

### The Officer/Participant

Simulation-based training can create a fairly high level of anxiety for some participants. This anxiety can be displayed in numerous ways. Some participants may refuse to participate. Others may participate but not take the training seriously. Still, others who participate may be so overcome with anxiety about the training that they may make mistakes in the exercises they otherwise would not have made. Trainers need to be prepared to deal with these and other possible outcomes when they undertake simulation training. Participants need to be allowed to conduct themselves during an exercise without any "coaching" from the trainers. It is the trainer's responsibility to sit back, observe and critique at the conclusion of the simulation. It is also the trainer's responsibility to be sure that no one is injured during the exercises. If things appear to be

getting out of hand, the trainer must step in and stop the action.

At the outset of an exercise, participants should be provided with only the information about the simulation that they would normally have if it were an actual situation. Participants should be encouraged to carry with them any and all equipment that they would realistically have with them for that particular situation.

Trainers should also be alert for any officers who may seem to be strongly affected by a scenario. Should an officer make a mistake during an exercise that would, in a real life situation, result in an injury, a hostage situation or would turn fatal, the trainer should make a note to review what happened and make certain that the officer's self-confidence has not been negatively impacted. At the conclusion of each exercise, trainers should make sure that they have identified all of the positive behaviors displayed by the officers as well as any behaviors that were not. Remember that the purpose of these sessions is to assist the learning process. If a trainer only emphasizes the negative, then that's the only thing the officer will remember.

As previously mentioned, a trainer needs to understand, when embarking on a simulation-based program, that their role is uniquely different from that of a "traditional" training role. Unlike a traditional stand-up training program, simulation training calls on a variety of skills from the trainer. Trainers must be good listeners and observers. They must know how to allow participants to make mistakes during an exercise and fight the need to immediately step in and correct the officer's performance. They must know how to provide constructive feedback. They must be subject matter experts so that they can teach on a given area in a moment's notice and do it unscripted. From this last skill, it follows that trainers must be able to "think on their feet." Finally, trainers must be prepared to learn from their participants. Participants efforts need to be acknowledged and shared in the larger group debriefings at the conclusion of the program. Just as in the classroom setting, everyone has a learning curve in simulation training.

## Training Goal #2

"Strive for win-win situations in your simulations"

When people read this second goal they assume we are stating that simulations should be designed to assure success. This, they argue, is not realistic. This is not, however, what this goal implies. By creating simulations that are win-win situations we have simply built into the exercise



the opportunity for the officer/participant to succeed. Certainly, few would argue that the chance for a successful outcome exists in most any situation an officer could encounter, so why wouldn't this characteristic be built into the exercises. It would be a mistake to design a simulation that virtually assured success as it would, likewise, be a mistake to design a simulation that virtually assured failure. Either condition interferes with learning and would defeat the purpose of simulation training.

### Training Goal #3

"Constructively critique performance while not appearing judgmental"

Providing constructive feedback on someone's performance does not mean you provide only positive comments. What it does mean is that you learn how to comment on the negative aspects of their performance in a positive way, while also highlighting the positive aspects of their performance. Providing constructive feedback also means that the trainer should be able to fully explain why a particular response was positive or negative. This means that trainers must work through as many of these issues ahead of time as they can. Strive for clarity of thought and purpose. Remember, if it's not clear to you and your co-trainers why a certain response would be effective or not effective, you won't be able to clearly articulate this to the participants.

Always provide your feedback both verbally and in written form. Participants' emotions may be running high after an exercise. They may remember less than half of what you tell them following a simulation. Write it down for them so that they will be able to review it at a later time.

This brings us to the last point--video taping. Video taping and immediate playback allows the trainer to provide instant review and feedback to the participants, while the simulation is fresh in both individuals' minds. The old adage that "cameras don't lie" is especially true and helpful in this situation as many of the participants will have experienced the auditory and visual focusing common to all in stressful situations. By use of video the trainer can alleviate many of the "excuses" for ineffective performance and allow effective self analysis.

### Summary

SST provides effective, realistic safety training in a controlled environment, maximizing

learning potential. It also helps meet the legal challenges which dictate that static (lecture type) training is not enough when issues of performance under stress are involved. By use of the SST format agencies can develop training that is specific to their needs and provides the highest level of skill retention for participants.

However, even more than in a classroom setting, effective trainers are the key to success of the program. Just because a trainer is effective in presenting information does not mean they will have the skills to provide effective simulation training. The SST program can be structured to not only provide training to participants but can also contain a "Training of Trainers" component enabling the agency to continue the simulation model, focusing on specific agency issues and desired skills.

# Day 2

# **PROBATION OFFICER SAFETY TRAINING**

**Presented by**

**COMMUNITY CORRECTIONS  
INSTITUTE**

**AND THE**

**SUPREME COURT OF OHIO  
JUDICIAL COLLEGE**

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# **SAFETY SIMULATION TRAINING**

## **PROGRAM OVERVIEW**

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- A. PROGRAM OVERVIEW**
- B. SAFETY AWARENESS OVERVIEW**
- C. YOUR ROLE IN SIMULATION TRAINING**
- D. SIMULATIONS**
- E. LARGE GROUP DEBRIEFING**
- F. LUNCH**
- G. SIMULATIONS CONTINUED**
- H. LARGE GROUP DEBRIEFING**
- I. SST TRAINING SKILLS**
- J. ADJOURN**

# Introduction

# INTRODUCTION

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## SAFETY SIMULATION TRAINING™

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### **Introduction**

The Safety Simulation Training program (SST) represents the latest in safety training concepts specifically tailored for community corrections agencies. SST is a comprehensive approach to safety training that developed as a continuation of previously offered lecture and interactive training packages. The goal of SST is to provide current, practical safety training and to deliver this training using cost efficient, state-of-the-art methods and technologies. SST provides agencies the opportunity for an ongoing dialogue regarding the latest safety issues and continued individualized training development.

This simulation-based training program is designed to allow corrections agencies to take officer safety training from classroom theory to a real world setting. The curriculum package was designed to support the issues and concepts that were originally introduced in our previous Officer and Staff Safety programs.

SST presents a whole new set of challenges for participants. In a very real sense, simulation-based training "raises the stakes" for everyone. Participants will find that their role will be far more interactive.

After reviewing the philosophy, purpose and logistics of this package program, participants are presented with various scenarios. These scenarios simulate field settings, office settings, and home contacts. The backgrounds for each of these scenarios were taken from actual incidents reported by state, federal and county probation and pretrial services officers. The goal in simulation-based training is to create as realistic a setting as possible for officers; strive for win-win situations in order to facilitate learning and constructively critique an officer's performance without being judgmental.

An officer's performance is critiqued immediately following the completion of each scenario. The critique is done in conjunction with video playback as each simulation is taped to provide immediate, objective review of the participant's performance.



# Strategy for Safety: Overview

# **STRATEGY FOR SAFETY: OVERVIEW**

## **NOTE TO OFFICERS**

The information contained in the pre-work packet was developed to allow officers the opportunity to review many of the important concepts of officer safety prior to participating in the simulation training. Many of the safety concepts were incorporated into the simulation exercises in this package. This was done to provide continuity from classroom theory to an applied format. Reviewing this information and completing the attached quiz should serve as a refresher for officers and hopefully, increase the likelihood for successful outcomes in the exercises.

## **A Strategy for Safety: Introduction**

### **Preventive/Survival Tactics**

In Discussing officer safety one of the first distinctions that needs to be made is between the concepts of preventive and survival tactics. Preventive tactics have been defined as:

“ Those tactics that will help you prevent risky situations from escalating into life-threatening encounters.”

Survival tactics have been defined as:

“ Those tactics than can help you survive if, despite your best efforts, violence does erupt.”

Our mind can be the most effective weapon we carry. Mental conditioning is the most powerful tool in our safety and survival arsenal. Mental conditioning can prepare you for a crisis encounter before it happens and help you cope with stress hazards during and after its occurrence.

Mental conditioning embraces four concepts:

- 1) Personal commitment to safety-only you can make the commitment.
- 2) Mental awareness - color code of awareness helps to conceptualize mental awareness.
- 3) Crisis rehearsal - mental rehearsing “what if scenarios.”
- 4) Positive self-talk - reinforcing belief that you have skills and competencies to survive any encounter.

### **Color code of Awareness**

The color code of awareness is a conceptual way of thinking about your level of awareness that helps you to be prepared to act or react in crisis:

White - a totally relaxed state of mind. You are in familiar, safe surroundings. No one is a conceivable threat.

Yellow - A relaxed awareness of your surroundings. The people near you may not always be friendly. The officer should never be in less than condition yellow while at work, in the office or in the field.

Orange - A state of alarm. A possible confrontation may be seconds away. The officer should have a possible plan of action in mind or stored in his/her memory bank.

Red - This is a state of combat. You are a physical target. Mental conditioning and rehearsed tactics allow you to react instinctively.

Black - this is a state of blind panic. You freeze. The threat has overwhelmed your ability to react because of a lack of mental conditioning and rehearsed tactics. This is similar in concept to the reaction when someone unexpectedly jumps out and startles you; you're momentarily "frozen" and cannot react. If you had been alerted that someone would try to scare you by jumping out at you, your reaction would be totally different than when this occurs unexpectedly

Here are some exercises that can help you raise your level of awareness.

1) While in the field, narrate to yourself everything you see. This helps you to become more aware of your surroundings. You may begin to see things in the environment that you had never noticed before.

2) When you are with a partner, rehearse the way you would handle different scenarios, to include the roles that each of you would play. For example, imagine that you are confronting an offender in the field. Decide who will be the contact officer (deals directly with the offender) and who will be the cover officer (monitors the surrounding area for potential danger). Agree to use certain "key words" that will serve to alert each of you regarding specific dangers.

3) Review "what if" scenarios (a form of crisis rehearsal). This can be done alone or with a partner. Mentally rehearse how you would react to hostile situations. Visualizing proper techniques you could employ in crisis programs your nerves and muscles to respond automatically under stress. Remember, "under stress, in a crisis, you will instinctively revert to the way you have trained." Expect the unexpected!.

4) Practice positive self-talk using phrases such as; 'I will return home each night,' I will survive this incident,' 'I have the skills to survive any hostile encounter,' I will come out on top.'

## **Continuum of Force**

The continuum of force provides a model for crisis response-a frame of reference and guide to the proper use of force. The model used by the Federal Corrections and Supervision Division appears on the next page. The continuum of force represents several levels of responses designed to gain compliance from another person. Once compliance is achieved, the officer de-escalates the use of force but does not relinquish control of the situation. Officers have the flexibility to move within the continuum of force in order to match their level of response with that of the assailant. It is not necessary to go through each preceding level before attempting the next level of force.

The continuum of force is relative, not absolute. The level of force used may depend on your knowledge of the offender (such as record of violence, martial arts training, and physical condition) and your own skills and size relative to the offender. The level of force response is also dependent upon the level of aggression that is demonstrated by the assailant. The information in the far right column of the model presents levels of assailant behavior that are matched with appropriate levels of response by the officer. Of course in any situation where retreat is possible the officer is expected to do so rather than use physical force, but only if retreat can be done safely.

### ***The Continuum of Force model***

Firearm/Lethal force	Shoot/strike Draw/point weapon Hand on weapon verbal warning	OVERT HOSTILITY Actions will probably cause death or serious physical injury.
Empty Hand Control	Various defensive tactics	Actions are aggressively offensive and may cause injury
Cap-Stun	Use Cap-Stun Present Cap-Stun Hand on Cap-Stun Verbal Warning	
Verbal	Heavy Control (warning) Crisis diffusion Light control Persuasion Questioning and assessment	RESISTANCE Subject is cooperative in response to direction
Presence	Defensive stance Interview stance	COMPLIANCE Subject is cooperative without direction

### **Safety v. Evidence**

Remember, no evidence is more important than your safety.

“If a situation makes you feel nervous, back-off and reconsider. Do not take foolish risks. Do not let ego interfere with common sense.” (From FBI’S High risk Encounter Techniques)

Mental preparation begins before we have contact with the defendant.

Four questions to ask yourself before going into the field:

- 1) What is the purpose of the contact?
- 2) What is the likelihood of danger?
- 3) What can I do to reduce/prevent danger?
- 4) should I go alone?

### **Physiological Response To Crisis**

Each of us experiences some type of physiological response to crisis events. We should anticipate these, recognize them, and condition ourselves to get past them in order to respond effectively to the crisis. Common physiological responses to stress include:

- Adrenaline surge
- Muscle tension (loss of fine motor movement, e.g. fingers)
- The face blanches (goes from red to white signaling change in blood flow)
- The bronchial tubes constrict
- Breathing goes from rapid to deep
- Judgment becomes limited as evidenced by
  - tunnel vision
  - time distortions
  - problem solving ability deteriorates
  - hearing becomes distorted

Remember this survival statistic: If you get shot, you have

- an 80% chance of survival if you are aware you have been shot, and
- a 90% chance of survival if you reach a hospital alive.

## **Understanding the Human Animal**

Individuals reacting to what they perceive as a threat to their well-being will respond by using the “fight or flight” mode. That is, they will either confront or retreat from the perceived threat. Because these responses employ a strong emotional component, individuals will display both verbal and non-verbal behaviors which, if interpreted correctly, can tell us either they are simply reacting to the perceived threat or are actually posing a danger to us.

There is a distinction between individuals who are merely reacting to a perceived threat and those who represent a genuine danger to an officer. Your primary goals as an officer are to

- 1) Always remain in a thinking behavior, and
- 2) Bring the offender into thinking behavior.

One type of behavioral response that is commonly used by offenders is anger. Anger is a purposeful behavior which experts suggest is the result of a conscious choice rather than an instinctual reaction. People choose anger because it is a tool that, in the past, has gotten them what they want.

When dealing with offenders we cannot anticipate how they will respond. One day, they can be rational individuals and the next day they can be completely irrational. Life’s circumstances sometimes dictate how we respond to a perceived threat. We also need to understand what emotional and physical stressors the body can handle and still remain in balance. The goal of knowing as much as we can about the lives of our offenders is important to an officer’s safety. Identifying these stressors can assist us with anticipating the likelihood of an aggressive response by an offender. In order to appropriately manage our clients, we need to be able to identify specific types of behavioral responses.

### **Bluff Behaviors**

Bluff behaviors are behaviors used to communicate, deter, or frighten through intimidation. The three types of bluff behaviors are: anxiety, defensive, and aggressive. All three behaviors have specific characteristics.

Anxiety behaviors are defined as seemingly purposeless behavior that signal low level fear and/or confusion. Anxiety behaviors can be manifested as pacing, twitching, rocking, tapping fingers, chain smoking, shaking, etc. Recommended responses to this type of behavior include active listening, acknowledging feelings, acting nonjudgmental and generally responding in a positive and reassuring manner.

Defensive behaviors are defined as seemingly purposeful behaviors designed to protect against a mid-level perception of threat. A person displaying defensive behaviors will appear to be in a



“system-shutdown.” This means that the individual’s auditory, visual and cognitive functions are now primarily focused on the perceived threat. Recommendations for responses to this type of behavior are explicit. Use the “Rule of Five” to communicate, that is, communicate with sentences of no more than five words and words with no more than five letters. Raising the sound of your voice for a short period of time may also help because, as mentioned, the individual may be in auditory shutdown. Finally, ask questions or make statements that require the individual to think about their behavior or connect their choices, both negative and positive, with consequences.

Aggressive behaviors are defined as active intimidation perceived for high level flight/fight situations. This is the highest level of bluff behavior. There is energy buildup and escalation of movement and voice level. This is the last stage of bluff behaviors. The person is now approaching danger behavior. Signs and signals of aggressive behavior include continually questioning about the issue or your authority; the individual’s voice is elevated and they may refer to you or your position in less than kind terms; there may be total refusal to cooperate; and there may be a strong verbal attack. Responses to aggressive behaviors include clearly defining options and consequences to the individual; during a verbal attack, raise both hands with palms exposed, step back, and wait for the energy to be expended. Once the individual appears to have settled down, try interjecting with questions designed at getting the person to evaluate their behavior and the possible consequences.

## **Danger Behaviors**

After bluff behaviors, the next level of behavior that can be displayed by the offender is danger behavior. Danger behavior is a behavior with a high probability of threat completion. Danger behavior differs in that the focus of behavior is directed at YOU. The following characteristics constitute danger behavior:

- Quiescence - a period of quiet after a verbal attack. This is the calm before the storm.
- Feet are spaced.
- Leg and hip muscles are contracted.
- Shoulders are in line with hips.
- Elbows are bent and on a vertical plane.
- Neck muscles are contracted.
- The mouth is slightly open.
- Nostrils are flared and extended.
- Eyes are set and focused.
- The face flushes from red to white (noticeable in fair-skinned people).
- Fists are clenched but somewhat more relaxed than during aggressive behavior.
- Threatening behavior becomes focused toward you.
- Individual is persistent.

Much like bluff behaviors, your continued safety is contingent on how you respond to the perceived threat. Some recommended responses are:

- Reaffirm the consequences of any violent act.
- Increase the space between you and the aggressor.
- Maintain non-threatening body language while maintaining defensive posture.
- Look for escape routes.
- Assess the arrangement of the room as to put obstacles between you and the assailant.
- Summons assistance.

## **Summary**

Verbal intervention, when dealing with an aggressor or person displaying a bluff behavior, should always be aimed at determining the “why” behind these behaviors. First, engage in fact-finding, then engage in solution-finding. It is vitally important that you be able to bring a person into the thinking mode, all the while remembering that people only change their behavior when they perceive the change is beneficial for themselves. The final thought that bears repeating is that you can’t get anyone to function in the “thinking mode” if you yourself are not!

## **Strategies**

***“Under stress, in a crisis, you will instinctively revert to the way you have trained.”***

The above statement summarizes the rationale behind the “why” of safety training. It has been demonstrated time and again that when a crisis occurs people respond instinctively and that response is determined by the degree to which a person has prepared him or herself mentally as well as physically. The concepts that will be reviewed in this section are designed to facilitate an individual’s response to crisis situation. The review will address both office and field situations.

Strategies of safety and survival can be defined as specific actions or routines that, if practiced, can increase your level of safety and likelihood of survival. These strategies are an extension of mental preparedness and required commitment to practicing alertness and mentally rehearsing your action plan.

Many of the strategies to be discussed will sound familiar, but the question remains: “Do you practice them regularly?” They must become second nature to you to be used effectively in the high stress of a crisis situation.

### **Planning: Safety in the Office**

Effective safety practices begin in the office with good planning. When assessing the level of safety in your office numerous questions should come to mind: a) how safe is the layout of the office, b) what type of access do visitors have to our office, c) does our office have an emergency plan, d) does any staff member have CPR/First Aid training?, and e) do we routinely leave officers or other staff alone in the office? Questioning the safety status of your office is the first step in the assessment process and one that can lead to the rapid establishment of several important safety measures.

### **Crisis Rehearsal**

Part of the planning process also involves engaging in what is known as “crisis rehearsal.” that is, asking yourself “what if” questions. What if a colleague suddenly collapsed in front of me? What if an offender brought a weapon to the office and threatened an officer or staff member? Asking yourself “what if” questions can help heighten your safety awareness level. A good example of “what if” preparation involves the concepts of cover and concealment.

When assessing your safety and that of those in your office, understanding the difference between cover and concealment could mean the difference between survival and injury or death. So you want to ask yourself, what if I need to seek protection within the office? Where would I go?

## **Cover/Concealment**

When seeking protection you want to find “cover” in your office. When you want to hide from someone, you look for something that provides concealment. Examples of items that could provide cover for you in the office are your desk, a metal or thick wooden door, walls, concrete pilings, and filing cabinets. While each of the aforementioned items can also provide concealment not everything that provides good concealment also provides good cover. For instance, you could hide behind a curtain that provides good concealment but would be poor cover from a weapon. Locate items in your office that would provide good cover and/or concealment and plan how you would use it in a crisis situation.

Another example of planning our safety in the office is to ask yourself, what objects within your office can be used as weapons either against you or by you against another person? Items that should immediately come to mind are scissors, bookends, paper weights, hole puncher, letter opener, telephone, etc. Then ask yourself how would you use one of these weapons against another person? Where would you try to strike the other person? Vulnerable strike areas would include most areas of the head and neck and many areas of the body. Remember that any blow from the neck up could potentially result in death and is thus considered deadly force. Are you psychologically prepared to hurt another human being? Are you prepared to be hurt by another person? Your specific responses to these questions will depend upon the personal weapon available, your position relative to the assailant, the level of threat presented to you or someone else and the degree to which you are mentally and physically prepared for the confrontation.

## **Planning: Safety in the Field**

### **Risk Assessment/Equipment**

How do you assess the degree of risk in a contact? For years many officers have been taught to classify cases as either high or low risk. For safety purposes, officers would assume that there are no “low risk” contacts. There are high risk contacts and contacts that involve “unknown” risk. If we enter a situation believing it to be low risk, our level of alertness is reduced and our ability to react in a crisis is impaired.

In preparing to go into the field, officers are strongly encouraged to leave an itinerary with their vehicle description with their office. Officers should also establish a checking in system, e.g., call in twice a day or every two hours, or immediately before and after a particular contact. Office policy should require that recent photographs of officers, complete with physical descriptions, should be maintained.

What equipment do officers bring in the field? Examples of recommended equipment are a field book with photograph, telephone number for emergencies, cellular telephone or portable radio, flashlight, bullet-resistant vests, oc spray firearm (if qualified), government credentials.

## Approaches

Recommended techniques for making approaches to neighborhoods, residences and people have been identified in the safety literature. Several of these techniques include the following:

- 1) Intelligence: Know the area. Develop intelligence regarding neighborhoods, gangs, dealer hang-outs, etc. Where is the nearest help if needed? Are there friendly neighbors? What police jurisdiction are you in?
- 2) Drive by: Look for danger signs, i.e., loud music, dogs, party or company at the house, broken windows, etc. Survey all vehicles parked or moving in the immediate vicinity, pedestrians, and loiterers. When possible, park near enough to the residence to be able to get to your car in a hurry, but far enough away to avoid making yourself a target when you arrive. If you are making a high risk contact, notify local law enforcement ahead of time of your presence.
- 3) Walking to Residence: If you are with a partner, you should have discussed the case. Who is managing the contact? Do not speak to your partner during the approach unless it is urgent. Listen for activity you cannot see. Your hands should be free. Be aware of avenues of escape and potential hazards. If the residence is in a high rise or large apartment complex, remember your way in, note all exits, check with local authorities re: crime in the area. Use stairs rather than elevators, if possible. Use all of your senses. Expect the unexpected.
- 4) Knocking on the Door: Many officers know **NOT** to stand directly in front of the door when approaching a residence. When approaching the front door, locations for cover and/or concealment should have already been determined. After knocking, if a voice says "come in", **DON'T**. Have the person come to the door and let you in.
- 5) Residence Entry: Scan the entire room. Listen for activity in other rooms. Ask who else is home. If you sit down, choose your seat carefully. When in doubt...Leave!
- 6) Positioning: What is the person wearing? What is in their hands? Maintain an interview stance. Never stand with you strong/firearm side exposed to anyone during conversation and questioning. Never turn your back on an offender. Never permit an offender to move where you cannot see him.
- 7) Personal Distance: Maintain a distance around you of at least 5 feet. This is your safety zone. If you are alone and have more than one subject present, try to have them stand close enough together so you can see both of their movements at the same time.

## **Contact/Cover**

If you are with a partner, your chance of injury reduces by 70%. If you are with two others your chance of injury reduces by 90%. In contact/cover, one officer is managing the contact and one is providing support or counter-surveillance. The contact officer takes the lead and makes all primary verbal contact with the offender as well as anyone in the immediate vicinity. The cover officer's main responsibility is to "watch the /back" of the contact officer. Cover officer should watch the offender, occupants, and environment for any sudden or threatening signs. The cover officer should maintain an effective view of the surroundings and a clear path of escape.

When you are with a partner and are facing an offender, stand apart so the person has trouble watching both of you at the same time. When working with a partner, be aware of your positioning and how effective it would be should trouble erupt. Use triangulation to minimize the possibility of a cross fire situation should a conflict arise.

If there are two persons at the residence, the two officers should never lose eye contact with each other. If the two officers separate themselves from each other at the residence, they are responsible for their own safety.

## **Summary**

If given enough time to think about a strategy, we will often choose an acceptable approach. However, "under stress, in a crisis..." you may not have time to think through a solution, you will need to rely on training. Using good strategies and remaining mentally alert can help avoid a hazardous incident. Training, planning and crisis rehearsal can also help us survive an incident.

## Pre-Work Quiz

Now you have reviewed the previous safety information, take a few moments and see how many of the following questions you can answer.

1) Tactics defined as “those tactics that will help you prevent risky situation from escalating into life-threatening encounters” are known as

- a) survival tactics
- b) progressive tactics
- c) preventive tactics
- d) situational tactics

2) The term “mental conditioning” as discussed in officer safety, embraces four concepts. Name two of these concepts.

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3) The level of awareness in the color code of awareness that corresponds to “state of combat is:

- a) orange
- b) yellow
- c) white
- d) red

4) The first level of response listed in the Continuum of Force Model is:

- a) verbal
- b) presence
- c) empty-hand control
- d) cap-stun

5) According to the Continuum of Force Mode, lethal force should only be used when:

- a) the actions of a subject are aggressively offensive and may cause physical injury
- b) the actions of a subject will probably cause death or serious physical injury
- c) the actions of a subject are verbally aggressive and the subject is uncooperative
- d) the actions of a subject are disruptive and the subject is somewhat uncooperative

- 6) Mental preparation begins before we have contact with the defendant/offender. It is recommended that you ask yourself four questions before going into the field. What are two of these questions?

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- 7) Identify three types of physiological responses that we may experience in response to crisis events.

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- 8) Bluff behaviors are behaviors used to communicate, deter, or frighten through intimidation. The three types of bluff behaviors are:

- a) anxiety, defensive, aggressive
- b) anxiety, anger, frustration
- c) defensive, intimidation, anxiety
- d) anger, intimidation, fear

- 9) Danger behavior is described as a behavior with a high probability of threat completion. What are some of the verbal and non-verbal characteristics that constitute danger behavior? (Name three)

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- 10) Which of the following are not recommended responses to danger behavior?

- a) reaffirm the consequences of any violent act
- b) increase the space between you and the aggressor
- c) look for escape routes
- d) summons assistance
- e) all of the above are recommendations